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Abstract
The introduction of renewable energy generation (e.g. solar and wind) in the energy
distribution infrastructure makes balancing the total energy load and production
in the grid more challenging due to the weather-dependent nature of these energy
sources. One approach to mitigate the issue is to use weather forecasts to predict the
production and then offer incentives to electric vehicle users (EVUs) to charge their
vehicles during the times of energy surplus. However, doing this without leaking
sensitive information about the EVUs location and identity presents challenges to
the system design.
This thesis proposes a privacy-preserving architecture that allows the grid op-
erator to offer incentives for contributing to the grid stability, and to reliably and
automatically quantify the extent of each contribution while still maintaining the
privacy of the EVUs. Furthermore, the architecture enables decentralised privacy-
preserving dispute resolution without leaking any personally identifiable information
(PII).
The architecture fulfils the goal by utilising self-sovereign identity technologies,
such as decentralised identifiers (DIDs), and privacy-preserving digital credentials
solutions, such as verifiable credentials (VCs). They allow the solution to utilise
ephemeral identifiers and to compartmentalise the information into three different
knowledge domains to ensure that only the minimum amount of information needed
crosses any domain border.
An analysis of the solution indicates that the architecture ensures relatively strong
privacy guarantees to the EVUs and solves the grid balancing problem while reducing
the number of assumptions to the minimum. This makes the architecture applicable
to a wide set of use cases in the EV charging field. Future work includes a detailed
performance analysis of a proof-of-concept (PoC), although the information available
from related research already indicates relatively low latency and a good level of
deployability even on resource-constrained Internet-of-things (IoT) devices.
Keywords Privacy, Grid Balancing, Electric Vehicle (EV), Vehicle-to-Grid (V2G),
Verifiable Credential (VC), Decentralised Identifier (DID), Self-Sovereign
Identity (SSI)
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1 Introduction
This section introduces the challenges of grid balancing, describes the scenario
considered in this work, and presents the problem statement and the research
questions to be answered in the rest of the thesis.
1.1 The challenges of grid balancing
The energy grid infrastructure handles the generation and distribution of electrical
energy across well-delimited geographical areas, e.g. within a national border. The
long-range, high-voltage infrastructure transmitting energy from production plants to
municipalities and few large customers is managed by a transmission system operator
(TSO) [22], while the grid delivering the rest of the energy to end customers, e.g.
houses and small businesses, is managed by a distribution system operator (DSO).
In some countries, the two roles are performed by the same actor.
Operating and maintaining a grid infrastructure brings several challenges to the
DSO [18], including optimising the efficiency of the distribution grid, and avoiding
reverse power flows. Reverse power flows indicate the processes in which the energy
in the grid moves back towards the generation sites. Such reverse flows can generate
significant issues for the DSO due to the design of the energy grids, which are only
meant to handle unidirectional electricity flows from the generation sites to the points
of consumption.
To mitigate such issues, the DSO typically divides its coverage area into different
energy districts. The DSO can then deploy additional power generation facilities
within each energy district, typically producing energy from renewable sources [2], as
shown in Fig. 1. This is done to both distribute part of the energy generation process
and to reduce the dependency of the DSO on the main transmission infrastructure
and the TSO. Nevertheless, since the sources of energy in these smaller generation
facilities are typically renewable, the amount of energy generated to the grid cannot
be fully predicted as opposed to traditional power plants. For instance, a local plant
producing solar energy will be able to produce more energy during the daytime, while
a wind plant is more productive when there is a strong presence of wind. However
most of the peaks and lows in the energy generation can be forecasted with an
acceptable level of accuracy days before, on a per-district level.
The forecasted excess of energy can be mitigated using different approaches
including reducing the amount of energy produced locally, temporarily storing the
excess energy in facilities specifically built for the purpose, or by allowing users other
than the traditional customers to access the energy services, thus taking out more
energy from the grid and reducing the probability of reverse power flows. Due to their
increasing adoption [26][67] and their high mobility, electric vehicles (EV) represent
a convenient means for a DSO to level out peaks in the energy grid. For instance,
users of electric vehicles (EVUs) can be incentivised to charge during peak times, to
meet both DSO and EVU’s needs.
The interactions between an EV and the electric grid, including charging in-
teractions, are known as vehicle-to-grid (V2G) interactions. In the case of energy
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Figure 1: A conceptual model of the energy grid, with transmission, distribution and
distributed power generators.
charging interactions, EVs interact with the grid by communicating with charging
stations (CS) which might be owned by the DSO or by some independent, third-party
entity known as the charging station owner (CSO). For this reason, many of these
interactions raise several privacy concerns towards the privacy of the EVUs. Being
able to identify a CS in a charging transaction means being able to derive the exact
location where that transaction took place. If the identity of the EVU involved in
the charging interaction is also known or is derivable, it is possible to know who
(which EVU) was where (which CS), and at what time (the transaction timestamp).
In the long run, the entity or entities having access to this information can easily
track each EVU and determine typical patterns that can be used for activities such
as targeted advertising.
Thus, there is a need for a solution in which the needs of both the DSO and the
EVU can be addressed without threatening the privacy of the EVUs. In a system
like this, the DSO would still be able to incentivise EVUs to charge their EVs in a
specific district and within specific time frames, while EVUs would be able to charge
their vehicles without the risk of being tracked and profiled over time.
1.2 Use Case
In the scenario used in this thesis, illustrated in Fig. 2, a distribution system operator
(DSO) is willing to incentivise electric vehicle users (EVU) to charge at specific times
and in a specific district to reduce the amount of excess energy and avoid reverse
power flows. Whenever a new peak time is forecasted by the DSO, it publishes an
energy flexibility request on an energy marketplace. An energy flexibility request
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is a request by the DSO that a certain amount of energy needs to be consumed
in a specific energy district within a certain time range. The marketplace is not
accessible directly by individual EVUs but by energy retailers (ER). In addition to
providing charging services to their customer EVUs, energy retailers also fulfil the
role of mediators matching the energy needs of the DSO with the charging needs of
their customers. For their work of mediation, ERs are rewarded by the DSO every
time they succeed in completely satisfying an energy flexibility request published by
the DSO (i.e. when their customers charge for the amount of energy the DSO asked
for, which was enough to avoid the reverse power flow in a specific energy district).
EVU
1
*
*
*
*
*
1 1
*
*
CS
CSO
DSO
ER
Figure 2: Entity-relationship scheme showing the different relationships among the
actors in the market. The assumption here is that there is a single DSO.
The market relationships are defined as follows:
• A DSO has agreements with one or more charging station owners (CSOs) which
have deployed CSs in one or more energy districts.
• A DSO has agreements with one or more ERs to allow them to sell energy to
their customers.
• An ER has contracts with several different customer EVUs, and each EVU can
be a customer of one or more ERs.
• An ER can provide its services through the CSs belonging to one or more
CSOs.
• The CSs of a CSO can be used by one or more ERs.
Every time an EV charges at a charging station (CS), a charging event takes
place. Each charging event includes details such as the specific CS and the EVU
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involved in the transaction. However, having a per-CS granularity in the charging
events would represent a large threat to the privacy of the EVUs. Furthermore, with
the new General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)1, businesses are required to
reduce the amount of personal information collected to the minimum needed to offer
the service, and to adopt suitable measures to properly collect, process and store
such information.
Specifically, in these types of scenarios where a DSO needs to keep the energy
grid balanced, a district-level granularity for charging events is sufficient to verify
that the customers of a specific ER have charged for a certain amount of energy
within that district. Furthermore, a DSO is only interested in the amount of energy
that has been charged by the customers of an ER in a district during the peak time,
hence they should not care about the identities of the EVU or the CS involved in
any charging event. District-level information is also sufficient for the ER to receive
the incentives from the DSO. The ER also needs only information about the owner
of a specific CS, for billing purposes, without the need to identify the specific CS
that took part in the charging event. In the same fashion, CSOs should not be
able to obtain the identities of the EVUs or to derive patterns of EVUs’ habits by
simply collecting information from the CSs they own. The only information they
need concerns the ER that a specific charging EVU is a customer of, to correctly bill
that ER.
1.2.1 Requirements
Considering the aspects discussed above, the solution to the presented use case must
fulfil the following privacy requirements:
1. PR 1: The DSO MUST NOT be able to identify specific EVUs.
2. PR 2: A CSO and its CSs MUST NOT be able to identify a specific EVU
engaged in a charging event.
3. PR 3: A CSO and its CSs MUST NOT be able to infer that the same EVU
has taken part in two different charging events.
4. PR 4: An ER MUST NOT be able to infer that the same CS has taken part
in two different charging events.
5. PR 5: An ER MUST NOT be able to link its customers’ charging events to
specific CSs, but only to specific districts.
6. PR 6: Communication between the different parties (e.g. between EV and CS,
or between CS and ER) MUST NOT leak more information than needed that
would make correlation attacks against the EVUs easier (e.g. network-layer
identifiers such as IP and MAC addresses).
1https://eugdpr.org/
12
To make the use case generally deployable in real-world scenarios, the following
business requirements must also be addressed:
1. BR 1: The DSO MUST be able to understand how much each ER has
participated in maintaining grid stability in relation to the agreements for the
energy flexibility requests.
2. BR 2: ERs bill their customers in a postpaid fashion, thus they MUST be able
to monitor how much energy each EVU has charged over the billing period.
3. BR 3: CSOs are paid by ERs based on the charging services provided through
any of their CSs. For this reason, CSOs MUST be able to claim payments from
ERs by proving the authenticity of the charging events involving such CSs and
the ER customers.
4. BR 4: CSs MUST always verify that an EV is authorised to perform a certain
charging operation before letting the EV charge for the agreed amount of
energy.
5. BR 5: EVUs COULD get some kind of reward from their ER every time they
contribute to the grid balancing.
1.3 Problem statement and scope
The goal of the work presented in this thesis is to understand to what extent the
application of the latest technologies in the field of Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI) allows
the creation of a system meeting the privacy and business requirements presented in
Section 1.2.1.
This thesis answers the following research questions:
1. RQ1: To what extent can the identity and location of the EVUs be protected,
considering a scenario in which such an identity must be known by the ERs
they are customers of?
2. RQ2: What are the possible relevant trade-offs between the privacy of an EVU
and the business requirements of the other parties involved, i.e. DSO, CSOs
and especially ERs?
3. RQ3: How can the system be designed so that the DSO can reliably and
automatically evaluate the contribution of each of the ERs to the grid stability,
without getting access to the identities of the individual users charging?
4. RQ4: How can charging events be logged and/or stored without revealing
any personal information so that it is still possible to rely on them for dispute
resolution between parties?
13
To achieve the aforementioned goal, an architecture will be designed that ad-
dresses all the privacy and business requirements introduced above. Specifically,
the architecture will utilise Verifiable Credentials (VC), Decentralised Identifiers
(DID) and Distributed Ledger Technologies (DLT). Furthermore, the architecture
will be analysed in relation to the research questions and to the privacy and business
requirements, to verify whether it addresses all of them.
1.4 Structure
The rest of the document is organised as follows. Chapter 2 introduces the main
technologies and frameworks used in the solution. Chapter 3 presents related work
that has been performed in the field of IoT privacy-enhancement solutions as well as
within the context of energy markets related to electric vehicles. Chapter 4 describes
the architectural choices taken during the design of the architecture. Chapter 5
provides details about the design of the solution. Chapter 6 performs an analysis of
the implemented solution and answers the request questions presented in the previous
section. Chapter 7 suggests possible future work. Finally, Chapter 8 presents the
conclusions.
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2 Background
This section introduces and explains the main technologies that have been used for
the design of the solution.
2.1 Hyperledger Indy
For the scope of this thesis, the Hyperledger Indy framework has been used. Hyper-
ledger is an open source blockchain-related project started by the Linux Foundation
in 2015. Since its start, the Hyperledger Foundation has developed several tools and
solutions to help spread the development of DLTs, blockchains, and blockchain-based
solutions [36][37].
Indy, one of the projects, has been developed to provide a solution to manage
digital identities that are authentic and privacy-preserving thanks to the usage of a
permissioned blockchain2. The Indy framework has been used to create the Sovrin
Network3, a public network for issuing and verifying digital credentials, launched
in July 2017. The network is regulated by a consortium of companies, known as
the Sovrin Foundation, and new nodes can join the network after going through an
identity verification process.
Since Indy relies on a permissioned DLT, the entities in an Indy network must
fulfil one or more of the following roles: trustees, stewards, endorsers, and users.
Trustees are the entities that regulate the network. They have full authorisation
to elevate/demote other entities privileges, as well as to accept new entities in the
network.
Stewards can add one and only one validator node to the network. This node
would connect to the other nodes in a peer-to-peer manner, would get its state in
sync with the global state by running the consensus protocol, and would then be
able to serve requests received by the users. A steward can also register identities for
endorsers to on-board them onto the network.
Endorsers correspond to the public entities that are capable of issuing digital
credentials. Public institutions usually join the network as endorsers, even though
they might be willing to run a node as well, in which case they would also be stewards.
Users are the entities interacting with endorsers to receive digital credentials.
They are usually on-boarded onto the network by endorsers, upon a verification
process taking place by some other means (e.g. offline) that leads to the issuance of
some type of digital credential.
2.2 Distributed Ledger Technologies (DLTs)
The term ledger denotes a registry in which an entity, e.g. a company, logs all its
expenses and income over a certain period of time4. Every single expense or income
is defined as a transaction. A transaction T changes the ledger state from Ss−1 to
2https://www.hyperledger.org/projects/indy
3https://sovrin.org/
4https://www.dictionary.com/browse/ledger
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the new state Ss such that the new state Ss includes the effects of executing the
transaction T on the system at state Ss−1. Transactions involve two or more accounts,
uniquely identified across the entire ledger, with the structure of the identifier specific
to each ledger.
One key property of ledgers is immutability: all the transactions that are performed
are permanently stored in the ledger history, with no possibility to delete them. The
only possible way to revert the effects produced by a transaction T1, if possible, is to
execute another transaction, T2, producing the opposite effects as T1. If no other
transaction is executed between T1 and T2, the ledger state can be reverted to the
one in place before T1 was executed. Nevertheless, even though the final and initial
states are equivalent, the two transactions T1 and T2 are both registered into the
ledger history.
With the advent of computers and digital devices, physical ledgers have been
replaced by their digital counterparts. In the case of distributed ledgers (DLTs),
the ledger is replicated or split onto different machines geographically spread across
several connected sites connected. Each machine that is part of the network is called
a node.
A subset of DLTs, blockchains, organise transactions in blocks and link blocks
with one another [24]. In a blockchain, transactions are not executed as they are
submitted to the ledger, but they are temporarily collected in a specific space of
the working memory, called transaction pool, by each node in the network. Due
to their geographical distance, the pool of each node can contain a different set of
transactions. Every B seconds, the block time, these transactions are submitted to
the system as a block for evaluation and execution.
Which transactions are included in each block and in what order depends on the
node that is responsible for committing the block to the blockchain’s history. This
process depends on the specific implementation of each blockchain and on the set
of rules regulating how transactions are evaluated, executed and distributed across
the nodes: the consensus protocol. Once a block of transactions is added to the
blockchain history, it is cryptographically linked to the previous one to form a chain,
from which the term blockchain comes. The cryptographic link makes the new block
immutable and serves as a proof of the blockchain current state so that changes
to any previous blocks would result in a change of all the successive blocks up to
the current last block as well. The inconsistency between the last cryptographically
valid block and the altered one as the result of the change of a previous block in the
chain would easily be detectable by the network [24]. This mechanism ensures the
immutability of the ledger in blockchains.
2.2.1 Properties of DLTs
The distribution of data across several machines has benefits but also poses some
challenges to the implementation of DLTs.
The first benefit is availability. Availability is the capability of the system to
provide its services with no downtime [28]. It refers to the time the system has been
working properly over the total time it has been deployed. For instance, a system
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that has worked for 99 hours over a 100 hour period in which it has been deployed
has 99% availability. In a distributed ledger, availability is provided by the presence
of multiple nodes storing the same replicated global state: the failure of a single node
or a small subset of nodes does not affect the capability of the system to perform its
job and to satisfy requests by clients.
The second benefit is data replication, denoted as the capability of the system to
store the same copy of the data on multiple nodes. This is very similar to performing
several backups of the stored data every time the data is updated. The higher the
number of nodes in the system, the higher the guarantees that the data stored will
not be corrupted/lost. This, however, also leads to a higher cost for updating such
data, since more nodes need to update their copy of the data.
One challenging aspect to take into account when talking about DLTs is that due
to their decentralised nature, the nodes replicate a part or the totality of the stored
data. For this reason, the data cannot be considered private since it is not stored on
only a single node. This issue is even more relevant if the DLT has no special policies
for regulating access and participation of nodes to the network, like in public DLTs,
or if the data is not encrypted before being replicated. These two aspects represent
great privacy issues to the data that is stored if they are not carefully considered
during the design of a system relying on one or more DLTs.
Another challenge for distributed ledgers is to ensure that the global state is
always consistent, i.e. all the nodes that are part of the DLT network have the same,
unique state at any given time [28]. This property is called consistency.
In a DLT, the mechanism to keep the global state consistent across all the nodes
is called consensus. The main goal of consensus is to verify that the transactions
submitted to the ledger fulfil a specific set of conditions and to agree on their order,
which is critical to determine the resulting state. For instance, there could be two
transactions T1 and T2 in a block that is currently being evaluated by a node, where
T1 moves some money from account A to account B, currently with a balance of 0,
and T2 moves a smaller amount of money from account B to account C. If T1 is
evaluated before T2, the entire block is considered correct since all the transactions in
it can be executed with no errors, so the block can be committed to the blockchain
history and the balances of the accounts A, B and C are updated accordingly. On
the other hand, if T2 is evaluated before T1, the block will be considered invalid
since T2 fails due to the lack of funds in account B to operate. Either choice can
be made, but the consensus must ensure that the same choice, i.e. the same order
of transactions, is executed by all the nodes in the network. In case this does not
happen, there might be nodes in which the block is executed, increasing the balance
of accounts B and C, and nodes in which the block is not executed, leaving the
balance of account B to 0.
In a centralised ledger, all the data resides on the same machine or in a set
of machines controlled by the same entity, hence it is easier to keep consistent.
Nevertheless, in a centralised ledger, there is a single regulating entity that is
responsible for the correct working of the system, and users of the system must have
trust that the system works as it is supposed to.
As an example, in a financial context, such as a bank, there are two possible
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ways in which a malicious actor can perform unauthorised transactions on behalf
of a user: by compromising the user’s account, e.g. by stealing security codes and
banking credentials, or by compromising the bank IT system. The former case is
typically easier but still leaves to each user the choice to implement all the security
precautions to secure his/her account. In the latter case, on the other hand, the user
is not responsible for the unauthorised transactions. Instead, the trust relationship
established with the signature of a customer contract is broken, with the bank as
the only responsible party for the event. Alternatively, a distributed financial ledger
would make the second vector of attack more difficult to implement, since each
transaction needs to be explicitly authorised by the owner of the account and there
is no central authority that can be compromised.
2.2.2 Types of DLTs
A DLT can belong to one of two categories: public (permissionless) or private
(permissioned) [71]. A recap table is shown in Table 1.
A public and permissionless DLT is open for anyone to join, i.e. anyone can
install the required software and join the network by running one or more nodes.
Since it is a public DLT where anyone can propose new transactions to execute and
can also participate in the consensus process, there is a need for strong security
guarantees against malicious/invalid transactions and nodes running a malicious
version of the consensus algorithm. The requirements for stronger security measures
usually negatively impact the efficiency of the DLT both in terms of the number of
transactions that can be evaluated and executed per unit of time, and also in terms
of energy consumed by the nodes participating in the consensus protocol.
A private and permissioned DLT is in nature a private DLT, but capable of
accepting new nodes and participants and assigning them specific roles. The nodes
are typically organised in consortia, where legal contracts are signed and enforced.
In such DLTs, usually, a distinction between roles is evident: some nodes can execute
transactions against the ledger state and participate in the consensus process, some
nodes can only perform read operations, while some other nodes might only be
running the consensus protocol.
- PUBLIC PRIVATE
ACCESS READ/WRITE to anyone - READ to anyone- WRITE restricted
NETWORK ACTORS Untrusted Trusted/Semi-trusted
SECURITY
- PoW
- PoS
- Economic incentives
- Legal contracts
- Proof of Authority
SPEED Slow Fast
EXAMPLES
- Bitcoin
- Ethereum
- Monero
- Hyperledger Indy
- Ripple
- Libra
Table 1: Different types of DLTs and their properties [71].
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2.2.3 Consensus protocols
The consensus algorithm is the most important part of a DLT since it defines the
key properties of the DLT such as scalability, energy consumption and degree of
openness. Scalability refers to the capability of a system to handle a growing amount
of work by adding resources to the system [13]. Energy consumption represents the
amount of energy consumed by the nodes running the consensus protocol, which is
strictly linked to their environmental impact. For instance, the consensus algorithm
used in the Bitcoin cryptocurrency system consumes the same annual amount of
energy as Austria [23]. Degree of openness represents the capability of including new
nodes in the network once the network is already working.
Since nodes in a DLT network might behave maliciously, the class of consensus
protocols used to coordinate the nodes within a DLT network is called Byzantine
Fault Tolerant (BFT), from the very famous example of the Byzantine generals trying
to reach consensus whether or not to attack (all together) or not a village owned
by the enemy [45]. BFT protocols have been adopted in distributed systems long
before blockchains and newer consensus protocols were developed [7][19]. However,
due to the high degree of openness characterising some of the DLTs today, special
consensus protocols have been developed to increase the security guarantees of an
open DLT, to increase the costs of Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks targeting the
system availability, and to reduce the possibility of committing malicious transactions
to the ledger history. The two most important protocols that have been developed
are Proof-of-Work (PoW) and Proof-of-Stake (PoS).
Proof of Work (PoW): this consensus protocol is usually adopted in public
DLTs, and specifically in blockchains, where the set of validator nodes cannot be
trusted. The PoW consensus relies on specific mathematical problems that require
a large amount of resources (RAM, CPU or network) to be solved but that are
relatively easy to verify [39]. The validator nodes that compete with each other to
first solve the problem are called miners. The fastest miner to correctly solve the
mathematical challenge is given the possibility to add the new block to the blockchain.
Such a block contains the transactions that node has received, organised in an order
specified by the node.
The main goal of PoW is to reduce the possibilities of denial of service (DoS)
attacks, as well as to reduce the possibilities of attacks altering the past state of
the ledger. Nevertheless, PoW is vulnerable to a vector of attacks known as 51%
attack [72], in addition to being very energy inefficient due to the large amount of
energy required by miners to solve the complex mathematical problem for each block
[33][23].
Most well-known examples of blockchains using PoW-based consensus are Bitcoin
[51] and Ethereum [15]. The IOTA5 DLT also uses a PoW-based consensus, even
though transactions are not stored in blocks and linked to form a chain, but in a
different structure more suitable for IoT use cases: the Tangle [54].
Proof of Stake (PoS): this consensus protocol is also used in public blockchains,
albeit its adoption has only recently spread. In PoS, the validators do not compete
5https://www.iota.org/
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to solve a difficult mathematical problem, as in PoW. Instead, the validator of the
next block, the forger, is chosen based on a random selection where the weight is
represented by the stake each node has in the network, e.g. the number of coins
it owns [14]. For instance, a validator node whose weight is 20% will, on average,
validate 20% of the total blocks submitted to the blockchain history. Validating a
new block requires the forger to put part of its stake "at stake": in case the forged
block is declared invalid by the other nodes in the network, the stake is lost by the
forger.
The idea behind PoS consensus is that by allowing nodes that have more stake
to validate blocks of transactions, they have a larger interest in running the network
correctly. If the transactions are not properly verified and the network is not correctly
governed, the assets exchanged on the network lose value, since the remaining nodes
would have no interest in being part of a system where business rules are not enforced.
Nevertheless, if not correctly implemented, PoS is vulnerable to other attacks different
from the 51% attack affecting PoW consensus algorithms, such as the nothing-at-stake
or the false-stake attacks [41][10].
Main examples of blockchains implementing PoS consensus protocols are Nxt6
and Dash7. Ethereum has also planned to move from PoW to PoS consensus with
its Casper protocol [32][76].
The DLT on which Hyperledger Indy relies follows a permissioned model, with
new nodes that can join the network upon acceptance from some of the entities that
are already part of the network: the trustee entities [35]. The consensus protocol run
by Indy, called Plenum [38], is an enhancement of the Redundant Byzantine Fault
Tolerant (RBFT) protocol [5]. All the validator nodes that are part of the network,
called the pool, contribute to keeping the global state consistent by participating
in the consensus process. These nodes also interact with external applications and
clients to support the features provided by the framework, i.e. issuing, managing
and verifying digital credentials.
2.2.4 Smart contracts
An important feature of modern DLTs is the possibility to execute programs that
run on all the nodes of the network and that can access data stored on the DLT.
Such programs are called smart contracts, and the distributed applications relying
on the functionalities of one or more smart contracts are called DApps.
Several smart contracts have been developed for a variety of purposes, as in
the case of the Golem project [31], which has the goal of creating a global and
decentralised supercomputer composed of the machines of all the participants. These
participants are awarded tokens depending on the amount of processing power the
other users of the network have used.
Smart contracts can also implement more complex business logic and business rules.
6https://nxtplatform.org/
7https://www.dash.org/
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For instance, in the context of the SOFIE project8, one of the SOFIE framework
components consists of a smart contract template, customisable for the specific
use case and deployable on the Ethereum blockchain, enabling a decentralised
marketplace9. By interacting with the smart contract representing the marketplace,
different parties can perform actions such as publishing an auction, making offers
to participate in the auction, and closing an auction. The end of an auction would
automatically move ETH tokens from the winning account to the auction owner and
the asset specified in the auction to the auction winner’s account. The fact that
each operation invoked on the smart contract is performed by the whole Ethereum
network provides the security guarantees offered by the network and its consensus
rules.
2.3 Verifiable Credentials (VCs)
A credential is an attestation that, according to the issuer, someone, the subject, has
certain properties, e.g. granting him/her the authority to perform certain operations.
These properties can then be verified by the verifier, for example, to give access to
a certain service. For the verifier to consider a credential valid, there needs to be
a certain level of trust between it and the credential issuer. The relationships are
shown in Fig 3. Typically, credentials are issued from the issuer to the holder so
that it can be used by the holder to identify himself. Sometimes, as in the case of
children or disabled people, the holder of a credential might not be the same as the
subject: in such case, the holder covers the role of guardian and is allowed to use the
credential on behalf of the subject, when requested.
Examples of credentials are a passport, a driving licence, or a university degree.
All these credentials are affected by two main problems. The first problem is that
physical credentials are easy to spoof and to clone, making the verification process
usually more challenging and less reliable. The second problem is that usually
showing a credential, e.g. the driving licence, reveals more information than what
is requested by the situation. For instance, buying beer at the supermarket might
require the cashier to verify that the buyer is over 18, so all the extra information
revealed, e.g. name, address or even birthdate is not relevant for the use case and
might allow the verifier to collect information that is not supposed to collect.
Furthermore, upon issuance of a credential, the issuer and the holder are required
to be physically close, or there needs to be a third-party entity delivering the new
credential from the issuer to the verifier, with all the risks involved. Moreover, if
the credential to be issued is a digital one, it needs to be readable and verifiable by
machines to be exchanged over the Internet, stored and verified by a digital device.
A verifiable credential (VC) is a specific solution for digital credentials that can
be cryptographically verified to be authentic and not spoofed [65]. A verifiable
credential contains claims describing the properties of the subject: these claims are
8https://sofie-iot.eu
9https://www.sofie-iot.eu/news/decentralised-marketplace-using-smart-contracts
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Figure 3: Interactions between the different actors involved in a typical credential
usage from issuance to verification.
called verifiable claims. The flow for issuing and verifying VCs is not logically very
different from that of a traditional physical credential and it is shown in Fig. 4.
Verifiable credentials are usually signed by someone, and such a signature must
be verifiable. This implies that the identity of the signing entity must be retrievable
by or already known to the verifier to verify the conformance of the credential to
the expected requirements. For this purpose, a verifiable data registry stores the
identifiers used in a specific domain, the keys needed to issue/verify credentials, and
other relevant data that depend on the specific domain. This role can be fulfilled by
a centralised authority or, to reduce centralisation and enable the development of
privacy-preserving solutions, by a DLT.
Issuer
Issues
Holder
Acquires,	Stores,
Presents
Verifier
Requests,	Verifies
Verifiable	Data	Registry
Maintain	Identifiers	and	Schemas
-	Verify	Identifiers
and	Schemas
-	Register	and	Verify
Identifiers
-	Register	and	Use
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-	Verify	Schemas
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Presentation
Issue
Credentials
Figure 4: Different interactions taking place when using VCs [65].
When credential holders need to use one or more credentials for verification, they
can generate verifiable presentations (or proofs). A verifiable presentation is proof
that the holder of some VCs creates to prove to the verifier the ownership of one or
more credentials satisfying the requirements set by the verifier. Once the presentation
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is built and sent by the holder to the verifier, the latter can cryptographically verify
the validity of the presentation (by verifying the validity of all the credentials used
in the presentation), thus being certain the presentation has not been spoofed or
tampered with.
A peculiar characteristic of VCs is that they allow a VC holder to selectively
choose only a subset of the claims to be included in a verifiable presentation. Thus, a
verifiable presentation can be built from several VCs without revealing to the verifier
all the claims included in each of the credentials. Instead, the VC holder can create
a combination of claims that minimally satisfy the requirements imposed by the
verifier without leaking any additional, unnecessary information. This technique is
known as selective disclosure.
2.3.1 VC Structure
A VC contains metadata (e.g. expiration date, revocation mechanism), a set of
verifiable claims, and related proofs to verify the authenticity and integrity of the
credential.
VCs have a JSON structure [65], and the set of all the fields present in a VC is
called credential definition. Since VCs must be interoperable and machine-readable,
they include one or more contexts containing the semantics of the fields of the VC.
The value of a context is a set of URIs that, when dereferenced, allow the VC receiver
to retrieve machine-readable information about the context and the meaning of
any attribute in the credential. Including one or more contexts in a VC ensures
extensibility of a credential with fields that are not presented in the official draft and
that might be domain-specific.
The credentialSchema attribute defines the verification logic that verifiers will
use when validating the credential. It contains information that a verifier uses to
determine whether the data in the credential conforms to the expected schema. Each
claim in a credential can reference a different schema, and its verification logic will
depend on the specific schema that has been referenced. An example of a schema is
the JSON Schema [74], which is used to describe the structure of a JSON document,
expressing which fields, i.e. which keys, it should have and what is the semantic
meaning of each of the fields.
A key field in a VC is the proof field, which ensures verifiability for a credential.
The proof field is a set of cryptographic proofs that allow verifying integrity and
authorship of the credential. Credential integrity ensures that the credential has
not been tampered with since its issuance. Credential authorship indicates that the
entity presenting the credential has been issued the credential or has the right to
use the credential, as in the case of guardianship. This field is particularly useful
against credential spoofing since a copy of the original credential is not usable if the
authorship of the credential cannot be proved by the malicious holder. Because VCs
represent a very recent technology, there is not yet a standard nor recommended
proof mechanism. The two most actively used proof formats are JSON Web Tokens
(JWT) [40] and Linked Data Proofs [64].
Furthermore, verifiable credentials, like traditional credentials, can sometimes
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also be revoked by the issuer. For this reason, the validity status of a verifiable
credential should be verifiable. This is achieved using the method specified in
the credentialStatus field. As with proofs, there is no standard or recommended
approach to provide such service, so different approaches have been taken by different
implementations, preferring some properties over others, such as privacy or ease of
implementation and deployment.
2.3.2 Zero-Knowledge Proofs (ZKPs)
Zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs) are privacy-preserving proofs that allow proving
predicates about the properties of a subject, e.g. his/her age, without revealing the
values used for the proof, i.e. the subject’s birthdate [29][55].
A valid ZKP must satisfy three properties: completeness, soundness and zero-
knowledge.
• Completeness states that a verifier, upon receiving a valid ZKP, can trust that
the prover knows the secret with very high probability.
• Soundness specifies that, with a very high level of confidence, a prover who
does not know the secret is not able to cheat the verifier into believing that he
does. The level of confidence is called soundness error.
• Zero-knowledge property ensures that a verifier has no way of knowing the secret
used within the proof. The only information the verifier obtains is whether the
statement that has been made by the prover is true or not.
ZKP can be either interactive or non-interactive. The first class of proofs [30], as
the name implies, requires real-time communication between prover and verifier at
the time of the proof presentation. Although still powerful, they have received less
attention than their non-interactive counterpart due to their lack of flexibility and
their synchronicity requirement.
On the other hand, a non-interactive ZKP is a proof that a prover can present to
a verifier, without the requirement that both of them need to be able to communicate
synchronously with each other during the process [12]. This class of proofs has
received much attention and has also been adopted by some blockchain protocols
to preserve the privacy of the users as well as to hide some transaction details. An
example of this application is represented by Zcash, which has developed a type
of non-interactive ZKP called zk-SNARK, acronym for zero-knowledge Succinct
Non-interactive ARgument of Knowledge [60].
2.3.3 ZKPs and Verifiable Credentials
VCs can be included in ZKPs as long as they fulfil two requirements:
1. the VC must have the credentialSchema property so that all parties, i.e. prover
and verifier, can perform cryptographic operations using zero-knowledge tech-
nology, i.e. proof construction and verification.
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2. the VC must have the proof property that indicates a type of zero-knowledge
proof can be built for the credential.
In a verifiable presentation (an illustration is shown in Fig. 5), credentials (or
part thereof) can be included as-is, i.e. as they were issued by the issuing party, or
they can be used to derive secondary verifiable credentials with privacy-preserving
proofs.
For example, a credential containing a claim about birthdate of the subject might
be used in two different ways. In the first case, whenever the proof that the age of
the subject is over a certain value is required, the birthdate can be used directly
by adding it to the presentation. In this case, the verifier will learn the age of the
subject, and even just the knowledge of the birthdate might represent unneeded
information leakage. In the second case, the claim about the subject’s birth date can
be used to generate a derived credential, called secondary credential, with a predicate
proving that the subject age is greater than the required value. This solution does
not reveal any more information to the verifier than needed.
2.3.4 VCs in Hyperledger Indy
Although different implementations of VCs have been developed, such as Credly10,
uPort11 and VC-JS12, this thesis considers VCs within the context of Hyperledger
Indy, which is relevant for the scope of this work.
In Indy, a very strong focus has been devoted to the development of an identity
system which would follow privacy-by-design principles [20]. The main idea of Indy is
to use the underlying DLT to only store the elements that do not represent personal
information for an entity, i.e. only information that can be made publicly available,
such as the public identity of a business or a government. These elements must be
accessible by everyone able to interact with the ledger.
In addition to public identities, credential schemas and credential definitions are
also stored on the ledger. In this way, proofs built from a set of credentials by a
prover can then be independently verified in a non-interactive and privacy-preserving
way by the verifier by retrieving the needed schemas, definitions, and verifications
keys used in the proof directly from the ledger. This avoids the requiring verifier
to contact the issuer to verify each proof, preventing the latter from deriving usage
patterns of specific credentials. A detailed description of the structure of credential
schemas and definitions can be found on one of the Indy GitHub repositories [35].
Verifiable credentials in Indy have been implemented as a type of privacy-
preserving credential called anonymous credentials [8] by following the design choices
of the Idemix anonymous credential system, developed by IBM [17]. For maximum
privacy, anonymous credentials have been combined with DIDs (discussed in Section
2.4) as identifiers for credential subjects and issuers.
10https://info.credly.com/
11https://www.uport.me/
12https://github.com/digitalbazaar/vc-js
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Figure 5: Structure of a verifiable presentation obtained by two different VCs [65].
The Idemix protocol provides privacy by allowing a credential holder to use
different identities when interacting with each party, known as pseudonimity. The
holder will be known with identity H1 when communicating with the issuer to receive
a credential and with identity H2 when communicating with the verifier to present a
proof.
Before requesting his/her first credential, the future credential holder generates
and blinds, by the means of some cryptographic function, a private value known only
to him/her, called master secret. When requesting a credential from an issuer, the
holder sends the blinded master secret along with the credential request. The value
of the blinded secret is then embedded by the issuer into the credential, so that the
credential holder is the only entity that can prove the knowledge of the master secret
and, hence, the ownership of the credential. The cryptographic details of how this is
achieved are explained in [11].
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Credentials, and hence also verifiable credentials, can be issued as well as revoked.
The latter process must be designed carefully to not break the privacy or the identity
of the credential owner. The typical approach for privacy-preserving credential
validation schemes is based on either signature lists [52] or forward revocation lists
[69]. The former is more time-efficient than the latter, but both solutions are
computationally expensive for most devices, especially in Internet-of-Things (IoT)
scenarios.
Therefore, Indy has taken a different approach by using cryptographic accumu-
lators with bilinear maps [16] and tails files [9]. At a high level, a cryptographic
accumulator can be considered as a product of several different prime numeric values,
which gives it the name accumulator. Considering an accumulator V = a · b · c · d,
the values a, b, c, and d are defined as tails, while any product with one missing tail,
for example the product b · c · d, is defined as a witness. Fig. 6 gives a visual example
of a cryptographic accumulator.
For a secure cryptographic accumulator, it must not be possible to retrieve any of
the factors contributing to the total product starting from the value of the product, a
special type of pre-image attack. In Indy, resistance to pre-image attacks is ensured
by using modular multiplication, since division is not defined in the modular world,
making such attacks harder to put into practice. Moreover, to lower even further
the probabilities of successful attacks, Indy makes use of tails that are larger than
any numeric type can contain, and for this reason, they are stored on the underlying
DLT in binary files. Each line of these tails files represents a tail, corresponding to a
very long binary number. The line of each tail within the file is called the index.
Before issuing any credential of a certain type, its credential definition must be
created and stored on the ledger by the issuer. Furthermore, if the credential supports
revocation, the issuer must store on the ledger a revocation registry. Such a registry
is composed of a set of metadata indicating what cryptographic accumulator is used
and what tails file is used for the credentials conforming to the credential definition.
When a new credential is issued, the issuer communicates to the credential holder
also the index of his/her tail within the tails file as well as the witness, i.e. the
product of all the other tails of the credentials that have been issued up to that
moment. The tail represents the private factor known only to the issuer and the
identity holder. The knowledge of one of the valid tails as well as of the witness allows
the holder to generate a proof of non-revocation without requiring the intervention
of the issuer during each proof.
The proof of non-revocation proves that the credential holder can provide the
mathematics to derive the value of the accumulator saved on the ledger by multiplying
the private factor known only by him by the value of the witness. In this way, the
privacy of the identity holder is preserved to a higher degree, since the issuer is not
involved at all in the proving process and does not obtain any information about
where a credential holder has used a specific credential.
Each time a credential is revoked, or periodically, the issuer must update the
value of the cryptographic accumulator by removing the values corresponding to the
tails of the credentials that have been revoked. In this way, all the holders of the
27
revoked credentials will not be able to provide anymore the mathematics to compute
the new value of the accumulator since their tail is not part of the product anymore.
11101010110001010
10101010110101010
11100010010011001
10101110010011000
10101101100011001
x = 01111...00000
11101010110001010
10101010110101010
11100010010011001
10101110010011000
10101101100011001
x = 01101...00000
BEFORE
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1
2
3
4
5
1
2
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TAIL	INDEX TAILS	FILE	CHUNKS CRYPTOGRAPHIC	ACCUMULATOR
Figure 6: Example showing how credentials are revoked and how it affects the
cryptographic accumulator. Greyed-out chunks indicate chunks that have been
revoked and do not contribute to the final value of the accumulator.
2.4 Decentralised Identifiers (DIDs)
According to the official definition, "Decentralised Identifiers (DIDs) are a new type of
identifier for verifiable, self-sovereign digital identity. DIDs are fully under the control
of the DID subject, independent from any centralised registry, identity provider, or
certificate authority."[56]
DID technology is very recent, and its design still under development by the W3C
Credentials Community Group13 [56]. Fig. 7 shows an example of how DIDs work in
the case of an individual, Jane, interacting with several different entities, e.g. her
bank, a public institution, or her employer’s IT system.
According to Cristopher Allen, one of the main contributors to the design of
several identity-related specifications, among which also DIDs, an identity is self-
sovereign if the identity owner plays a central role in the administration of his/her own
identity [3]. This means that identity owners must be able to control the identities
13https://www.w3.org/community/credentials/
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they own and disclose them to the interested parties when needed. Furthermore,
they must be able to stop sharing such information with the certainty it cannot be
used anymore by any other party. Some of the advantages of using DIDs are in Table
2.
Figure 7: Self-sovereignity achieved by allowing each user to control his/her own
keys and identities and disclose them when needed [48].
For self-sovereign identities to be extended to a large number of services and
use cases, they ought to be as interoperable as possible. Thus, DIDs have been
designed to follow all the self-sovereign identity principles and to differentiate from
the traditional Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) [73].
2.4.1 Properties of DIDs
A DID is entirely controlled by its owner and does not depend on any central
authority for its generation, verification, or revocation. The structure of a DID is
did:method:identifier. The first component is the URI scheme identifier and always
has the value did to indicate that the URI represents a DID. The second and third
parts are specific to each class of DID.
Since DIDs are decentralised, also their governance does not involve any centralised
party to create or delete classes of DIDs. Hence, anyone can create a new class of
DIDs by specifying a new method. A DID method must define the rules to generate
new identifiers (the identifier component in a DID URI), as well as how all the
DID-related information are created, read, updated and deleted. A list of all the
currently-known DID methods and their specifications can be found in [66].
A DID can be resolved to a DID Document. A DID Document is a set of data
that describes the subject of a DID, including mechanisms, such as public keys, that
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the DID subject can use to authenticate itself and prove their association with the
DID.
To achieve maximum decentralisation, the resolution of a DID to a DID Document
(very similar to what happens with DNS today) should take place in a decentralised
yet reliable manner, e.g. via a DLT. Nevertheless, as long as there is a trust
relationship between a DID resolver and the parties interacting using its services, a
DID resolver can also be a central entity offering a DID lookup service. A draft is
currently under development to try to design a set of common characteristics and
features that all DID resolvers should provide [58].
GOAL DESCRIPTION
Decentralisation
Eliminate the requirement for
centralised authorities or single points of failure in
identifier management, including the registration of globally
unique identifiers, public verification keys, service
endpoints, and other metadata.
Control
Give entities, both human and
non-human, the power to directly control their digital
identifiers without the need to rely on external authorities.
Privacy
Give entities, both human and
non-human, the power to directly control their digital
identifiers without the need to rely on external authorities.
Security
Enable sufficient security for relying
parties to depend on DID Documents for their required level of
assurance.
Proof-based Enable the DID subject to providecryptographic proof when interacting with other entities.
Discoverability
Make it possible for entities to
discover DIDs for other entities to learn more about or
interact with those entities.
Interoperability
Use interoperable standards so DID
infrastructure can make use of existing tools and software
libraries designed for interoperability.
Portability
Be system and network-independent and
enable entities to use their digital identifiers with any
system that supports DIDs and DID Methods.
Simplicity Favour a reduced set of simple features in order to make the technologyeasier to understand, implement, and deploy.
Extensibility
When possible, enable extensibility
provided it does not greatly hinder interoperability,
portability, or simplicity.
Table 2: Benefits of DIDs listed by W3C working group in the current community
draft [56].
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2.4.2 DID Documents
A DID Document contains information that makes DIDs secure, interoperable
(between DID methods) and machine-understandable. This widens the set of use
cases in which DIDs are suitable by including scenarios relying on machine-to-machine
communication, such as in IoT.
The context attribute adds semantic context to clarify the meaning of all the
properties included in the document. This is fundamental when two digital systems
need to communicate with each other and must use terminology and a protocol that
both systems can understand.
Another important component of a DID Document is the service attribute: it
enables the discovery of additional service endpoints under the control of the DID
subject. For instance, an endpoint can be the URL of a REST API where the DID
subject offers additional services. For this reason, DIDs are a very suitable way of
bootstrapping communication between two untrusted parties.
A DID Document also contains information about the set of keys used by the owner
of the identity. The keys can be used, for instance, to encrypt the data addressed
to the DID’s owner so that it can be decrypted only by him/her, or to verify the
authenticity of the owner’s identity, e.g. via a challenge-response authentication
protocol.
Hence, by parsing the different components of a DID Document, a party is able
to verify the integrity of the document itself, verify that the identity of the DID’s
owner is authentic, fetch any encryption keys for the data to be sent, and possibly
bootstrap the communication according to the DID’s owner preferences. All the
functionalities are achieved without relying on any supervising/intermediary party
(exclusion made for a possible resolution service resolving DIDs to DID Documents).
2.4.3 DIDs in Hyperledger Indy
As explained in Section 2.1, entities in Indy can fulfil one or more of the following
roles: trustee, stewards, endorser, user.
Indy allows users to use pairwise pseudonymous DIDs in the interactions with
the different endorsers (e.g. banks, public institutions, government services): the
user generates and uses a different DID for each relationship he or she establishes.
All generated DIDs are stored in one or more offline wallets, each protected by a
master key.
Public institutions whose identity needs to be verified, e.g. for credential signature
verification, have also a public DID that is used to create credential schemas, credential
definitions and to issue credentials. These DIDs are the only DIDs that are used
more than once across several different transactions. In particular, endorsers use
per-connection pairwise DIDs to communicate with users, but will then use the same
public DID to issue the required credentials.
As an example, if Alice wants to start using digital credentials, she will need to
be on-boarded into the digital ecosystem by, for instance, her town hall municipality.
Upon proving her identity with a physical identity document, the town hall will
create a connection with her. The establishment of a connection is a multi-step
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process that results in Alice and the town hall each generating a pairwise DID. The
DID that Alice and the town hall have generated are unique to this connection, and
will not be used in any other connection by either party. This constraint enhances
the level of privacy and security of the system. If Alice will need to communicate
with another entity, e.g. her university, she and the university would go through
the same process of generating a new pairwise DID and use it in the connection
establishment process. An example of the different DIDs created to communicate
with different entities is shown in Fig. 8.
Bank
did:sov:alice2
did:sov:bank1
did:sov:bank2
did:sov:hall2
did:sov:alice1 did:sov:hall1
PUBLIC	IDENTITY
PUBLIC	IDENTITY
did:sov:bank
did:sov:hall
Alice
Town	Hall
Figure 8: Difference between public DIDs and private, per-connection DIDs. Dashed
lines represent pairwise connections, while stroked lines indicate the public DID of
both bank and town hall.
The main goal of generating a new DID for each connection is to reduce the
possibilities of linking the different interactions an entity is involved in. Since different
DIDs are used, it is not possible to derive any interaction pattern for any user and
understand which interactions involve the same users and with which entities they
have interacted with.
Since DID Documents contain also cryptographic information, they are used to
encrypt messages that only the receiver can decrypt, and also, from the receiver side,
to verify the authenticity of the sender. For a public institution, DID Documents are
also used to let users discover additional endpoints via which the communication can
be bootstrapped. For instance, a bank might expose three different REST endpoints,
and randomly include one of those every time a user tries to create a new connection.
In this way, the bank can implement a DID-based load balancer.
Once a connection has been created, the issuer can issue a digital credential. In
Indy, this operation is also a multi-step process which leads Alice, in the example
of the town hall introduced above, to have a verifiable and anonymous credential
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containing her registry information issued by the town hall. Now Alice has been on-
boarded since she has a digital credential and she can start collecting more credentials
by using her initial digital registry credential.
Nevertheless, a credential is not useful if it cannot be used to create presentations
(or proofs) and collect other credentials or access services. For this reason, Indy
supports proofs. If an institution requires Alice to prove certain attributes before
issuing a credential, it will use the previously created connection to publish a proof
request. Once Alice receives the proof request, it will build a proof (a verifiable
presentation) containing some or all of the following attributes, depending on the
case:
• Disclosed attributes: verifiable claims that are included in the presentation
without obfuscating their value.
• Predicates: zero-knowledge predicates about specific verifiable claims. They
can be either built directly from a verifiable claim or derived from them.
• Links: if the presentation includes claims from more than one credential, they
are used to prove that all the credentials used in the proof have been issued to
the same user.
• Non-revocation: if any of the credentials used in a proof support revocation,
it is used to prove that all such credentials have not been revoked.
Once the institution has positively verified the proof, it can publish a new
credential that Alice can obtain.
Before being an Hyperledger project, the Indy framework was developed by
Evernym14 under the name of Sovrin. For this reason, the DID method used in
Hyperledger Indy is called Sovrin and has the structure did:sov:<identifier> [48].
The Sovrin DID method is defined as follows:
CREATE: DID creation follows specific rules. The DID must be unique across
the entire system. The entity willing to have its DID registered will need to first
generate the needed encryption and signing keys. Then, it will add the public
components into a DID Document, along with other details, and will send the DID
Document to the party that has the rights to write the DID Document onto the
ledger. Trustees can write DIDs belonging to other trustees, stewards, endorsers,
and users. Stewards can add DIDs only for endorsers and users. Endorsers can add
DIDs only for users, who in turn cannot register any new identity but only update
the one they own, e.g. rotating encryption/verification keys.
READ: anyone can look up from the ledger a DID and retrieve its associated
DID Document. The authenticity of the answer is either guaranteed by the fact that
several validators return the same document, or by returning also a cryptographic
proof based on Merkle trees [49][50].
14https://www.evernym.com/
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UPDATE: the owner and the optional guardian of a DID are the only entities
that can update the associated DID Document since they are the only ones owning
the associated private keys. An UPDATE transaction is sent to the ledger, which
must be signed with one of the keys specified in the authentication property of the
DID Document.
DELETE: since DLTs are append-only, a DID and its document cannot be truly
deleted from the ledger. A semantically equivalent result is achieved by updating
a DID Document and setting its authentication keys to an empty list. In this way,
operations on that DID cannot be signed/verified anymore, making the DID unusable.
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3 Related work
This section presents previous research in the field of privacy-preserving vehicle-to-grid
(V2G) interactions, grid balancing via electric vehicle charging, and privacy-preserving
charging schemes. Privacy-preserving authentication and authorisation schemes for
IoT devices, including decentralised identifiers (DID) and verifiable credentials (VC),
are also discussed.
3.1 Grid balancing with EVs
Some of the solutions to the grid balancing problem have considered electric vehicles
that act both as additional energy generators (by discharging at CSs in case of
scarcity of energy in the grid) and as energy consumers (by charging at CSs in case
of excess energy).
Since additional (dis)charging operations impact the EV battery performance
over time and require extra effort by the EVUs, they need some form of incentives
to participate in the grid balancing activities and to be rewarded once they have
offered their vehicles for the purpose. Whenever they decide to contribute to the grid
stability, EVUs must be able to claim such rewards from the requesting entity, be it
the DSO or some second-level actor, by proving their participation. This is where
most of the privacy issues arise for them since the information revealed can allow the
other parties involved in the verification process to track each user’s activity over
time.
Furthermore, since it would be challenging for a DSO to interact with each EV
due to their number and their level of mobility, the role of the aggregator is typically
present in these use cases. Similarly to an energy retailer (ER), the main goal of an
aggregator is to assist the DSO in shaving the peaks and lows of energy production
and keep the grid stable, for which it gets paid by the DSO. An aggregator signs
agreements with several EVUs, and, during periods of potential grid instability,
rewards the EVs that help to keep the grid stable by charging/discharging at the
right time in the right place.
In Yang, Zhenyu et al. [75], the authors present a solution in which DSOs
and aggregators interact via energy charging/discharging requests published on a
marketplace accessible by both parties. After fulfilment of a request, the DSO pays
the aggregator who, in turn, issues digital tokens, called E-cash, to the EV owners.
E-cash can later be redeemed for some services such as battery maintenance or
parking discounts.
The solution is innovative with regard to how it handles the privacy of EV owners,
by using blind signatures and pseudonyms. On the other hand, there are design
choices that might lead to situations in which the system is compromised.
Specifically, the system includes a trusted entity generating and distributing
key pairs to all the other parties; the distributing party also knows the real match
between EV owners and all the pseudonyms they have used, for traceability reasons.
This represents a single point of failure for both the availability and the security of
the system: if such a central authority were to become compromised, the identities
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of the users would be compromised as well, and generation/verification of signatures
would no longer be considered reliable.
Also in Chen, Jie et al. [21], a marketplace-based solution is described where
the DSO publishes service requests in the form of auctions on an electricity market.
These service requests ask charging stations (CSs), acting as local aggregators and
aggregating several EVs, to charge or discharge a certain amount of energy within a
specific zone and within a certain time. Thus, the CSs compete with each other to
win the auction by requesting the lowest amount of reward to fulfil it.
Using traditional identifiers for the CSs would raise several privacy concerns
especially for the end users that agree to offer their vehicles to let the CS achieve its
goal. For this reason, a solution in which the identities of the CS are hidden ensures
higher levels of privacy.
In the work, the anonymity for the CSs in the transactions is achieved by the
means of group signatures and group membership certificates, while EVUs make use
of pseudonyms to hide their real identity. Nevertheless, it would be desirable not to
have a centralised authority, albeit trusted, in privacy-preserving solutions, since the
security of the entire system might be nullified for to the reasons explained in the
previous paragraph.
Nicanfar, Hasen at al. [53], Abdallah, Asmaa et al. [1] and Liu, Hong et al. [47]
also present solutions relying on a centralised identity for generating and manag-
ing identities of the parties involved. The papers propose different approaches to
preserving the privacy of the end-users but fail in providing an adequate level of
decentralisation which would make it possible to not rely on a single authority for
the security and privacy of the whole system.
In the first work [53], a centralised trusted authority, the Smart Grid Server
(SGS), generates keys and identities for both CSs and EVs. Furthermore, the SGS
has full knowledge of any interaction taking place between EVs and CSs thanks to
a private database containing all the needed data and metadata. Cyber attacks
represent a serious threat to the security of the system, as the SGS can soon be
identified as the single point of failure for both system security and availability.
The second paper [1] proposes a solution relying on temporary pseudonymous
identifiers for EVs and different types of message requests for charging/discharging
between a local aggregator, managing a fleet of EVs, and the DSO control centre
(CC) unit. The paper presents a protocol and proves its lightweight nature, which
makes the protocol very suitable for IoT scenarios as in the cases with CSs or EVs.
The payment model described in the paper involves the intervention of the
aggregator for each EV-CS interaction, e.g. for each charging event, since the EV
must pay each time it charges at a CS, and the aggregator remotely unlocks the charge
at the designated CS. Nevertheless, even though the identity of EVs is protected by
the usage of pseudonyms, the identity of CSs is not and is known to the aggregator
for each charging event, thus posing new privacy threats for EVUs.
The third work [47] analyses the three roles that an EV can play during its
interactions with the grid (request, store or provide energy), along with the privacy
implications of each of the scenarios. Requesting, storing and providing energy are
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slightly different operations relying on the same set of techniques to keep the identity
of EVs protected: group/ring signatures, a trusted certificate authority (CA) issuing
and managing keypairs for the EVs as well as providing authentication service to
querying aggregators, and session (pseudonymous) identifiers.
Although the proposed solution solves some of the privacy challenges typical
of role-based access control scenarios like the one presented in the paper, it does
not address others. Firstly, the presence of a centralised CA reduces the overall
security of the system and represents a single point of failure, in addition to being
a bottleneck. Furthermore, the use case considered does not take into account the
CSs, and possible identifiers used for them.
While more focused on optimisation algorithms to minimise the difference between
the amount of power supplied by the grid and the amount of power released by the
EVs batteries, the work presented in Rottondi, Cristina et al. [57] addresses the
privacy of the EVs involved in the process. For the purpose, the authors propose the
use of an anonymiser: an intermediary between the EVs and the local aggregators
acting as a proxy in the communication that replaces the real identity of the EVs
with pseudonyms and forwarding the request to the intended receiver.
Nevertheless, the introduction of a new entity in every interaction to hide the
identity of the EVs poses new challenges for securing the system and moves the
critical point of the system security to the anonymiser, which represents a bottleneck
of the proposed system.
Some work has also been performed on a higher level, aimed at identifying all
the security and privacy challenges typical of vehicle-to-grid (V2G) interactions.
In an attempt to propose a general framework architecture that V2G systems can
implement to enforce security and privacy by design, the work described in Saxena,
Neetesh et al. [61] addresses many of the challenges for that purpose. Among the
security objectives, the paper mentions mutual authentication for interacting parties,
information confidentiality, and message integrity. Regarding the privacy objectives,
much attention is paid on identity anonymity and vehicle untraceability.
The proposed architecture includes several entities interacting with each other
to achieve the goal: communication servers, authentication servers, control centres,
billing generation, and payment management servers. Anonymous authentication
schemes, i.e. authorising users without identifying them, might be used to ensure
identity anonymity and untraceability for EVs. Data confidentiality and privacy could
be implemented by using the latest encryption techniques, such as homomorphic
encryption, to enable computations over encrypted data without the need to decrypt
it.
The paper also highlights the challenges of deciding the best payment scheme
to use in such systems, with some schemes more suitable because of their flexibility
(debit/credit cards) but lack of privacy, and some other more privacy-preserving,
such as E-coins and prepaid cards, but less flexible to be adopted in a wide range of
different scenarios.
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3.1.1 Network anonymity
Some of the works presented above, specifically [21] and [47], do not address another
important concern: the leak of identifying information proper of long-lived network
identifiers, e.g. IP and MAC addresses. The nature of such identifiers (long-lived or
even fixed over time) is a real attack vector used in profiling and fingerprinting the
identities behind a specific identifier. For this reason, the information leaks that can
be generated by not properly masquerading those identifiers are very important to
address.
One work that properly addresses network-level information leaks is described in
Stegelmann, Mark et al. [68]. The solution presented in the paper proposes a system
designed so that communication between an EV and the aggregator, which do not
share full trust, takes place using an anonymity network like Tor15.
This issue is very important to address since network-layer identifiers correlation
cancels out any other attempt of hiding the identity of an EV and its owner from
the parties it interacts with. Nevertheless, the solution proposed also relies on a
centralised certificate authority for certificates management. Furthermore, the use
case considered in the scenario is quite restricted since aggregator and CS owner
are the same entity. Removing this assumption makes the management of the EV
owner’s identity and verifiability of transactions more challenging in the proposed
system.
Overall, the solutions proposed in the aforementioned sections address differently
the issue of hiding the identity of EV and EVUs from other parties. This is typically
achieved by relying on a trusted third-party that all the actors need to blindly trust
to operate correctly and to be secure enough to ensure the security of the whole
system. However, having a higher-level regulating authority creates dependencies
that can easily be removed by using decentralised approaches, where each entity is
responsible for its security and privacy.
The third-party introduced in the works, assuming it is not a specific aggregator
or ER, can identify specific EVUs by analysing the charging transactions, which
violates PR 1, described in Section 1.2.1. Furthermore, the business context and
requirements of such use cases are largely different than the ones given in Section
1.2.1.
3.2 EVs in charging transactions
Other work has focused only on the interactions between EVs and CSs during the
event of charging and their privacy implications, with no specific use case such as
grid balancing.
The authors in Langer, Lucie et al. [46] provide a high-level explanation of what
are the privacy challenges related to authentication and billing when charging an
EV at a CS, without proposing a concrete solution to address them all. The authors
15https://www.torproject.org/
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divide the use cases into four categories: controlled/uncontrolled customer-premises
charging, and controlled/uncontrolled public-premises charging.
The former two cases indicate charging events taking place at the EV owner’s
private premises, in which the grid operator might (controlled) or might not (uncon-
trolled) be involved in the charging process (e.g. by offering discounts to charge in
specific times of the day).
The latter two cases refer to charging events in which an EV is charged in a place
different than its owner’s premises, introducing additional privacy-related precautions
that must be taken into account when designing a system offering such feature.
The paper also suggests possible solutions to enhance the privacy of such charging
events, such as the use of district-level information instead of per-CS identifiers or
hiding the identity of the user charging by using pre-paid smart cards. The latter
approach raises new issues about linkability of transactions since smart cards are
typically statically identified over their lifetime.
Au, Man Ho et al. [4] propose an easy-to-deploy solution which allows the EV
owner to hide his/her identity across charging events by using pseudonyms and
zero-knowledge proofs (ZKP). At the same time, the system provides auditability of
transactions by introducing a third-party judging authority that can intervene only
upon EV owner request; to do so, the EV owner is required to disclose the secret
used to generate the pseudonyms and the ZKPs.
In the scenario described in the paper, the CSs only act as a front-end terminal
routing the traffic from the EV to the billing server (for heavier cryptographic
operations) and vice versa. Nevertheless, no mention is made about possible side-
channel leaks, such as IP-related information, which would allow a CS to link two
separate charging events to the same vehicle.
To introduce some degree of decentralisation to address the typical problems
affecting centralised systems, in Knirsch, Fabian et al. [42] the authors have proposed
a solution in which the main interactions between EVs and CSs take place via a
blockchain-based energy marketplace. On such a marketplace, the EVs publish
requests to charge in a specific area, before a specific deadline and for a certain
amount of energy, and the CSs compete with each other to offer the lower price to
charge.
Even though the scope of the paper does not cover any specific payment method,
it does not take into account possible malicious behaviours of either the CS or the EV.
The paper also does not consider possible interruptions in the energy flow through
the CS during a charging event, resulting in the CS being paid anyway for the total
amount of energy since such payment is made beforehand. Such a case can only be
resolved by third-party trusted authorities.
Furthermore, no mention is made about how an EV can be sure that a winning CS
is located within the region specified in the request, so some kind of authentication
mechanism should be in place to let entities mutually authenticate.
The use of ZKPs and decentralised technologies such as blockchains offer ways to
address several privacy and security challenges, including the presence of a central
authority. The idea of a decentralised marketplace where contracts can be signed
and immutably stored on a shared ledger increases the probability that the parties
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signing the contract adhere to their obligations. Nevertheless, more challenging is
the resolution of possible disputes, where the privacy of the entities involved must
still be maximised.
In a decentralised solution, this should be possible to achieve in a way that proves
that all the parties involved in a transaction agreed to execute the transaction, without
identifying the specific parties involved. Decentralised solutions, like blockchains,
are also extremely beneficial for addressing information leaks from Internet-based
communications since there is no direct communication between two entities, but
everything takes place through the execution of transactions. In this case, the privacy
problem is moved onto the identifiers used in such transactions, e.g. whether they
are reused or used only in a single transaction. For single-use identifiers, proving the
ownership of an identifier (e.g. proving the binding between a single-use identifier
and a real identity) becomes a big challenge, especially for identifiers used in past
transactions.
3.3 EVs location privacy with known identity
Since almost no ER is yet willing to accept anonymous payments from its customers,
the fact that traditional payment systems are mostly used by EV owners to pay
aggregators/retailers for their charges limits the potential benefits that can be derived
from introducing privacy-preserving payment solutions.
For this purpose, Frosch, Tilman et al. [27] aim to find a viable way to preserve
location privacy of an EV and its owner when his/her identity must be known to
the aggregator/retailer for business and billing purposes. The paper identifies three
main problems in the area and proposes three solutions.
1. When an entity, e.g. a CS, makes use of digital signatures with the same
signing key, it is easily identifiable across multiple interactions.
2. For regulatory purposes, often smart meter information (e.g. its identifier)
must be included in the transaction details. This is very similar to including
details about a specific CS in a transaction.
3. Network-based identifiers like IP and MAC addresses can also leak information.
All of the aforementioned issues seriously threaten the location privacy of the
EVs involved in the charging transactions, since the specific CS involved in each
transaction is easily identifiable and can be located on a map.
To address the listed problems, the following solutions are proposed in the paper:
1. Use of a group signature scheme. Such a scheme allows signatures to be verified
as belonging to a specific group, i.e. the group of charging stations belonging to
CSO1, without revealing who within the group has signed a certain transaction.
2. The smart meter information can be added in the transaction as blinded, e.g.
hashed, and the original value can be disclosed to a trusted third party only if
needed, e.g. upon dispute resolution.
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3. Use of an anonymizing communication network such as Tor for all Internet-based
communications.
Although the solution addresses many of the problems typical of cases in which the
identity of the EV owners must be known to their ERs, it still contains some potentially
exploitable flaws, such as the key management procedure which is still performed in a
centralised way. Furthermore, in the solution proposed, the regulatory entity, which
also issues all the keys and the certificates, has access to every single CS identity,
charging event and metering data. The resulting concentration of responsibilities
makes the regulatory entity a sensitive target to attack to leak EV identities. Hence,
a more decentralised and distributed approach would be recommendable.
3.4 ISO 15118 and the POPCORN protocol
In the recent years, the ISO standardisation body has started looking into electrical
vehicle charging scenarios and has produced a set of standards, ISO 1511816, to
regulate the communication between EVs and CSs and to enhance the level of
security in the related use cases. The standard defines details and protocols for V2G
interactions, such as network and application requirements, physical and data link
layer requirements, and various conformance tests. Nonetheless, while security has
been widely considered and thoroughly analysed in the standard definition, privacy
protection has not been addressed, and the results of a formal analysis presented in
[6] highlights it.
The POPCORN protocol, presented in Höfer, Christina et al. [34], has been
developed to be compliant with this standard, while at the same time improving its
shortcomings regarding the privacy of EVs and their owners. The enhancements intro-
duced by the POPCORN protocol concern four areas: minimising PII (Personal Iden-
tifiable Information), privacy-preserving functional alternatives, privacy-preserving
information flows, and privacy-preserving payments.
The minimisation of PII involves the usage of dynamic identifiers to authenticate
an EV to a CS, with the authentication process happening offline between CS and
EV and not relying on any external service.
The privacy-preserving functional alternatives aim to replace privacy-sensitive pro-
cedures with their privacy-preserving counterparts: for instance, replacing traditional
X.509 certificates with anonymous credentials due to their property of selectively dis-
closing the minimum information required depending on the authentication context.
Privacy-preserving information flows address leaks at the communication channel
level and suggests using anonymising communication channels to reduce such leaks,
as in the case of IP and MAC addresses.
The last enhancement, adoption of privacy-preserving payments, refers to the
introduction of a trusted payment handler acting as the intermediary between the
ER and the DSO and hiding the details of the payer from the payee while ensuring
that parties are fairly remunerated for the services they offer.
16https://www.iso.org/standard/69113.html
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Based on the identified improvements, the POPCORN protocol defines 5 phases
to allow an EV, customer of an ER, to charge at a CS, owned by a CSO while
retaining its privacy.
A key element of the protocol is the continuous exchange of metering receipts
between the CS and the EV. At regular intervals, the EV sends a signed meter
reading to the CS which can verify it and, in case of successful verification, continue
supplying energy. The process can be interrupted at any time if the EV sends
readings that are not consistent with the information that the CS has or vice versa.
The rest of the protocol definition details how such receipts are sent to both DSO
and ER for correct billing, and how the privacy of the entities involved is preserved.
Since the work performed is very relevant (especially because of its conformance
to a very recent ISO standard), the protocol has been formally analysed in Fazouane,
Marouane et al. [25], with the result that the properties such as anonymity and strong
unlinkability cannot be formally proven. Furthermore, the challenge of providing
privacy-preserving payments has been solved with the introduction of a trusted
payment handler acting as the intermediary between payer and payee.
A more decentralised and distributed approach would be desirable in such case so
that the actors do not need to rely on a single entity (also a single point of failure)
to ensure that payments are correctly processed.
3.5 DID-based authentication and authorisation in IoT use
cases
The application of decentralised and privacy-preserving techniques such as DIDs and
anonymous credentials in the IoT world has only recently been studied, as in Lagutin
et al. [44] and Kortesniemi et al. [43].
The authors in [43] study the application of DIDs and VCs in the energy sector,
in a scenario very similar to the one depicted in section 1.2. In the work, the authors
perform a feasibility study of using DIDs and VCs in such scenario, classifying electric
vehicles and charging stations as IoT devices. The solution proposed uses single-use
DIDs for both EVs and CSs and specifically-crafted ZKPs to allow EVs to charge
without the risk of privacy leaks.
By using changing DIDs, the EV identity is not revealed to the CS. Furthermore,
by combining DIDs with digital signatures, the ERs can prove the fulfilment of
an energy flexibility request published by a DSO without revealing any personal
information about the users involved in such transactions.
The usage of anonymous credentials containing the district information about a
CS make sure that charging transactions do not contain information related to any
specific CS. This is sufficient, since for grid balancing district-level information is
the minimum level of granularity needed by both DSO, to reward ER, and by ERs,
to bill their customers. In this way, CSs and CSOs are not able to link multiple
transactions to the same EV, since dynamic identifiers are used for them. In the
same way, the ER is not able to derive whether the same CS has been involved in
several charging events. The usage of anonymous credentials and ZKPs ensures that
the information exchange is verifiable, authentic and that only the minimum amount
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of information required is shared between parties.
For its privacy-preserving measures, its decentralised nature and its applicability
to IoT scenarios, several cues have been considered as the starting point for the
architecture presented in the rest of this thesis.
3.6 SOFIE Decentralised Energy Flexibility Marketplace
In the context of the SOFIE17 project, one of the pilots developed aims to solve the
problem of grid balancing by allowing owners of EVs to charge at defined times of
the day: by doing so, they can receive incentives, discounted prices, and rewards [63].
This section describes the use case implemented in the pilot and analyses its
limitations with respect to the privacy of the EVUs and suitability for large, real-world
deployments.
3.6.1 Use Case
The entities interacting in the pilot are very similar to the ones presented in Section
1.2, albeit some design choices make it only suitable for a small set of scenarios and
not fit for more general use cases.
As depicted in Fig. 9, a distribution system operator (DSO) manages the
distribution grid and is mainly interested in keeping the grid balanced and avoiding
reverse power flows. Owners of electric vehicles (EV) are interested in charging
their vehicles, perhaps taking advantage of peak times to obtain discounted prices or
some other form of reward. The link between the needs of the DSO and those of
the electric vehicle users (EVU) is represented by the fleet managers (FM). A FM
has several EVU customers to which the FM provides charging services at any of
the CSs it owns. These CSs can be remotely controlled by the FM to lock/unlock
charges, and their metering data can be accessed to both DSO and their FM. The
main business of a FM is to offer charging services to EVUs, and to obtain rewards
by the DSO every time they actively and successfully contribute to the grid stability
by shifting EVUs charges to the grid peak times.
Upon forecasting a possible reverse power flow in a specific energy district of
the grid, the DSO can publish an energy flexibility request on the Ethereum-based
energy marketplace in the form of an auction. These requests are related to a specific
energy district, include a certain amount of excess energy that needs to be taken out
of the grid, and have a deadline before which such energy must be removed to keep
the grid balanced. The FMs then compete with each other on the marketplace by
offering the lowest amount of rewards requested to fulfil the DSO request (i.e. to
take out of the grid all the excess energy before the deadline).
Technically, publishing a new energy flexibility request on the marketplace means
deploying a new smart contract on the Ethereum blockchain where the FMs can
make bids for the number of rewards, and once an agreement is reached (i.e. the
DSO chooses the winning FM), the DSO finalises the request and escrows the agreed
amount of rewards in the form of digital assets.
17https://sofie-iot.eu
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Figure 9: Relationships between parties in the SOFIE Italian pilot. The 1 indicates
that only one entity is involved in a relationship, while the * indicates the involvement
of one or more entities. E.g. an EVU can be a customer of only one FM, while a
FM can have several customer EVUs.
The conditions for the reward are periodically verified through the interaction
between the smart contract and an external oracle. The oracle is owned by the DSO
and it is implemented as an API that allows querying a specific marketplace request
and returns the total percentage of completion. This is achieved by fetching the
total amount of energy used to charge EVs in the district since the energy flexibility
request start time. If the 100% is reached before the expiration time, the smart
contract moves the escrowed assets to the FM, otherwise, they can be claimed back
by the DSO. To work, the oracle API relies upon the smart meters embedded within
each deployed CS.
Once the FM has won the energy auction for a specific district, it will notify
its customers of the new opportunity available. Customers that choose to charge
following the indications of the FM can typically benefit from discounted prices for
their charges. At the same time, they would allow the FM to increase the possibilities
to fulfil the request and to receive the escrowed rewards from the DSO.
When EVUs need to charge their EVs, they contact the FM via their device and
ask for a charging code for a specific CS. The FM generates and returns the code
which is then shown to the CS as a proof the EVU has been authorised by the FM
to charge. The CS forwards the code to the FM, which unlocks the charging if the
code matches one of the codes generated for that CS and has not yet been used, and
charges the related EVU accordingly.
3.6.2 Limitations
The novelty in the approach adopted in the pilot is the automation of contract
agreement and contract resolution (i.e. paying the escrowed rewards to the FM if
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the energy flexibility request is fulfilled). Such automation is achieved via the usage
of smart contracts deployed on an Ethereum blockchain. The blockchain stores the
signed contract between the DSO and the winning FM to make the terms of the
contract immutable once the agreement has been reached.
The verification of the progress of the request fulfilment is also performed by the
smart contract which, by querying an external oracle [70] maintained by the DSO,
can detect when the required amount of energy has been taken out from a certain
district. Once the request has been fulfilled, the smart contract moves the rewards,
in the form of Ethereum assets, from the DSO account to the FM account which, in
turn, might issue some rewards to the customers involved in the transactions that
contributed to the request fulfilment, in addition to the cheaper price offered to them
for the charging service.
Nevertheless, some limitations are affecting the system. First, a more realistic
scenario would assume that the CSs are not owned by the FM, but rather by an
independent, third-party entity such as the charging station owner (CSO). FMs
would then be allowed to use the CSs owned by the CSO, which will then charge the
FMs based, e.g. on the amount of energy provided in charging services using such
CSs. Therefore, the process of proving the extent to which an FM has contributed
to the grid balance becomes challenging due to the larger number of actors involved.
Another limitation of the system is the use of static identifiers for both CSs and
EVs. With the use of long-lived identifiers, anyone having access to the history of
transactions can easily start tracing patterns of usage for EVUs and know exactly
where each EVU was at a specific time, due to their interactions with the CSs. In
the long term, each EVU can be profiled by the other parties, making him/her a
very attractive subject for targeted activities, such as advertising.
By evaluating the implemented solution in the SOFIE Decentralised Energy
Flexibility Marketplace pilot with the privacy requirements presented in Section
1.2.1, and by assuming that the role of the ER in the requirements is performed by
the FM in the pilot, we come to the conclusion that the pilot does not fulfil the
privacy requirements 1, 4 and 5. Depending on who has access to the history of
transactions, also privacy requirements 2 and 3 might be violated.
Overall, the assumptions that have driven the pilot development make it not
properly fit for more general scenarios, in which more actors are involved and CSs
are owned by independent businesses. Moreover, the privacy of EVUs has not been
carefully considered in the design of the interactions between the different entities.
The result is a system in which EVUs put their privacy at risk to receive discounted
prices for their charges and some form of rewards.
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4 Architectural choices
This section discusses the key choices that have been taken during the design of the
architecture: how to bootstrap the communication between a CS and an EV at the
beginning of a charging event, how to validate charging credentials before supplying
energy, and how to reliably prove the correct amount of energy supplied.
4.1 CS-EV communication bootstrap for a charging event
Whenever an EV is near a CS in order to charge, the two entities must become
visible and start communication with each other. This means that either the CS or
the EV needs to trigger the beginning of the interaction. Furthermore, the CS and
the EV cannot utilise any information collected about each other during previous
transactions, since the system must ensure that transactions are not linkable with
each other.
One approach would be to let the CS continuously advertise its information, such
as the proof-of-ownership by the CSO, the ERs authorised to offer charging services
at that CS, and the district identifier. In this way, an EV can automatically detect
that a CS is advertising information and, if the CS fulfils the charging requirements
(e.g. a specific ER is among the authorised ones and the district identifier is a specific
one), the EV can proceed with the charging transaction.
Nevertheless, several possible solutions implementing automated charging trans-
actions without explicit involvement of the EVU have been designed and analysed
before the final proposed architecture. However, it has been challenging to identify
some that would not be vulnerable against different classes of attacks, from MitM
(Man-in-the-Middle) attacks to DoS (Denial-of-Service) attacks. In some scenarios in
which the EVUs were showing charging certificates before cryptographically verifying
the authenticity of the CSs, the identity of those EVUs were even at risk. The core
of the problem is located in the fact that some bootstrapping information was sent
unencrypted between the CS and the EV since they needed some initial handshaking
procedure to create a temporary encrypted communication channel. This information
is then exploitable by malicious third-party users to either prevent the honest parties
to ever reach an agreement, to flood one of the parties with requests that would not
lead to any successful charge (DoS attack), or to pretend to be one of the two parties
(MitM attack).
For this reason, the final solution requires that the very first step in a charging
interaction involves the manual intervention of the EVU. In particular, the EVU
would interact with a CS using a short-range communication channel (e.g. NFC
or QRCode) to exchange cryptographic information that the CS could then use to
encrypt all the successive traffic. The use of a short-range communication channel
makes the attacks described above harder to put in practice, because they would
require either compromising the scanning tool used by the CS (e.g. a second NFC
reader on top of the first one), or the malicious users to trick the EVUs to show them
the same information that they show at the CS, so that the messages exchanged can
be decrypted. Specifically, the manual trigger requires the EVU to communicate
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to the CS a DID and its associated document specifying the encryption keys to
successfully establish a connection between the CS and the EV. Upon connection
creation, the communication can take place securely and the charging interaction
can be correctly completed.
4.2 Charging credential validation process
Another choice that has been made concerns the charging credentials used by the
EVUs and their issuance and validation. Specifically, one possible solution would
require an EVU to register to the ER, before each charging transaction, the temporary
DID used in that transaction. Then, during the charging transaction, the CS would
ask the EVU for a proof containing the information about which ER was offering
the charging service to the EV. The credential previously issued by the ER to the
EVU would then be used to fulfil the proof request.
Once the CS has verified the proof, it establishes a temporary connection with
the EVU’s ER and queries the ER about the authenticity of the EVU’s DID. In a
correct scenario, that DID would have previously been registered by the EVU to
the ER and then communicated to the CS in the initial steps of the transaction. To
prevent any possible information leaks and reduce DoS attacks surfaces (e.g, external,
unauthorised entities querying the ER about some EVUs), before a query, the CS
must also prove to the ER that it belongs to one of the CSOs with which the ER
has an agreement.
If the EVU had indeed previously registered the new DID with the ER, the ER
returns a signed response stating that the EVU is one of its customers. Once the
ER has confirmed and signed the identity of the EVU, the charging event can take
place, and the signed response serves as a proof that, at the moment of the charging,
the ER had authorised an EV to charge at a specific CS.
The disadvantage of this approach is that the ER endpoint needs to constantly be
available for CSs to verify DIDs presented by the EVs; this represents a single point
of failure both in terms of availability and security of the system. The charging of an
EV at a CS should not be dependent on the availability of the ER endpoint during the
transaction. Hence, a solution to this problem would be to use a more decentralised
approach, which is the path taken during the design of the final architecture.
In the proposed solution, the EVUs generate a certain amount of DIDs e.g. at
the beginning of the day, and then request their ERs to generate as many charging
credentials, each authorising a different DID to charge. These credentials are short-
lived and should preferably be used only once by the EVU, to avoid correlation
attacks, since each credential reveals one of the identities used by the EVU in the
charging transactions.
During a charging transaction, a CS could simply verify that a charging credential
has been issued by an authorised ER and that it has not expired to let EVUs charge
their cars and bill the ER accordingly. In this way, the ER is not involved during
each charging transaction, and the charging certificates are only managed by the
EVU to whom they were issued.
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4.3 Energy supply confirmation
One relevant issue faced during the design of the interactions concerned how to
validate the amount of energy that has been charged by a CS in a charging event.
During a charging transaction, the parties might behave maliciously, e.g. an ER
might be billed by a CS for energy it has never supplied, or the energy flow might be
abruptly interrupted due to some issues in the energy grid. For these reasons, the
effective amount of energy that is charged by the CS must be "certified" at the end
of the transaction, so that it is possible for all the parties involved to rely on the
certified information and to be sure that is the correct amount of energy supplied.
One solution would be to let the EV charge the maximum amount of energy it is
willing to charge, and then let the DSO sign the effective amount of energy charged
at the end of the transaction. This would be possible since the DSO has access to
the smart metering data for each deployed CS, and could retrieve the information
about the energy supplied by a CS in a charging transaction simply by having the
information about the CS involved and the transaction timestamp.
Nevertheless, the solution has two main issues. The first issue is that usually,
CSs have a smart meter measuring the activity of the entire CS, and not of single
sockets. This means that in cases in which two concurrent charges are taking place
at the same CS, a DSO cannot distinguish between the amount of energy supplied
in each of the charging sessions. The second issue is that to certify the amount of
energy charged by a CS, the DSO needs explicit information about the CS involved
(and hence its location). This information is not relevant for the DSO to verify the
fulfilment of energy flexibility requests, which only require information about the ER
involved, the amount of energy supplied, and the energy district of the CS providing
energy.
Hence, the solution proposed in this thesis adopts a different approach by letting
the CS and the EV mutually sign micro-transactions within the larger charging
transaction. The total amount of energy supplied is divided into small blocks that
are signed by both the CS and the EV. Only when the EV has signed a new block,
the CS will supply the next amount of energy specified in the block, and only when
the CS has supplied the amount of energy asked, the EV will sign a new block asking
for more energy. In this way, by reducing the risk affecting each party (e.g. by not
being paid for the energy supplied or not receiving the energy that has been paid
for), the charging interaction can be interrupted at any time by either party. The
sudden interruption of an energy transaction does not affect the security and/or
privacy of the transaction since the possession of the signed micro-transactions is
enough for both parties to prove that a certain amount of energy has been provided
by the CS to the EV.
Furthermore, for the same reasons explained in the previous subsection, with the
approach taken in the final architecture, the DSO does not represent a single point
of failure, as it would if it had to sign each charging transaction. The parties do
not rely on the DSO to validate the amount of energy supplied, hence the charging
transaction is solely dependent on the correct working of the CS and the EV.
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5 Architecture Design
This section describes the use case, the architectural choices taken, and the details
of the architecture implemented in this thesis.
5.1 System description
The main actors of the system have been presented in the introduction, but here
they are presented in more details.
• DSO: controls the grid network, and needs to avoid reverse power flows by
offering incentives to ERs if they can use a certain amount of energy for their
customers to charge, within a certain district and time frame. These requests
for energy flexibility are published on an energy marketplace in a form of
auction where ERs compete with each other based on the number of rewards
requested (i.e. the ER requesting the lowest amount of incentives as a reward
wins the auction).
• CSO: owns the CSs and makes them available to different ERs so that they
can offer their services to their customers via those CSs. Each time a CS offers
a service to an EV customer of an ER, the owner of that CS is paid a service
fee. The actual payment of the fees can be performed on a per-transaction
basis or at regular intervals.
• CS: is owned by one CSO and can be used by the customers of one or several
ERs at the same time, depending on the business agreements. They interact
with the EVs using machine-to-machine communication and then report the
details of the transactions back to the CSO system.
• ER: offers charging services to several EVUs. They compete in the energy
marketplace to win energy auctions and obtain rewards in case of successful
fulfilment. They collect transaction details from the CSO owning the CS
involved in each transaction and bill their customers at the end of the billing
period. They rely on the CSs from several CSOs to offer their services, even
within the same energy district.
• EVU: interacts with CSs to make use of the charging service. They can
be customers of multiple ERs, even within the same district. They obtain
discounts or rewards from an ER in case they contribute to an energy flexibility
request fulfilment by that ER, i.e. they charge in a specific district during a
specific time frame.
• EV: interacts with the CS during a charging transaction, after the transaction
has been initiated by the EVU. It also communicates regularly with the EVU’s
device to exchange information including new DIDs and charging credentials.
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5.1.1 Assumptions
The following assumptions have been made during the design of the architecture:
• GENERAL:
1. GEN-A1: DSO, CSO and ER are separate independent entities, i.e. no
actor fulfils more than one role at any given time.
2. GEN-A2: None of the parties involved, especially the ERs because of
their knowledge of the EVU’s identities, collude with each other to break
the privacy of EVUs.
• DSO:
1. DSO-A1: DSOs have knowledge about the precise location and the real-
time energy consumption for each CS deployed within their coverage area,
regardless of the CSO owning them.
2. DSO-A2: DSOs do not behave unfairly towards either the CSOs or the
ERs since unfair behaviour would make it impossible for them to make
use of the ecosystem to release excess energy in the long run.
3. DSO-A3: DSOs have a publicly accessible (e.g. stored on a distributed
ledger) identity defined by a DID and its associated DID Document. This
document defines the keys used by the DSO to sign credentials and the keys
used by the other parties to verify those signatures. The DID Document
also describes the DSO endpoint or endpoints that the other parties need
to use to communicate with it.
• CS/CSO:
1. CSO-A1: CSOs know the precise location and the real-time energy
consumption for each CS they own.
2. CSO-A2: CSOs are paid by ERs for each of their customers charging at
any of the CSs owned by that CSO.
3. CSO-A3: CSOs and their CS have an interest in offering as much energy
as possible to EVs. CSs are assumed to never deviate from the protocol
in a way that would lead to a valid charging event being classified as
uncompleted.
4. CSO-A4: CSOs have a publicly accessible (e.g. stored on a distributed
ledger) identity defined by a DID and its associated DID Document. This
document defines the signing keys used by the CSO to sign credentials
and verification keys used by the other parties to verify those signatures.
The DID Document also describes the CSO endpoint or endpoints that
the other parties need to use to communicate with it.
5. CSO-A5: CSs can deviate from expected behavior by validating charging
transactions that have never taken place.
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6. CSO-A6: CSs have enough processing power to perform public key
cryptographic operations.
7. CSO-A7: CSs can communicate directly with EVs (e.g. using Wi-Fi
Direct or Bluetooth).
• EVU:
1. EVU-A1: EVUs can deviate from expected behavior by charging without
registering the charging transaction, causing him/her to charge for free.
2. EVU-A2: EVUs can trigger charging events with CSs and to communi-
cate with their EVs via the usage of a mobile app.
• EV:
1. EV-A1: EVs have enough processing power to perform public key cryp-
tographic operations.
2. EV-A2: EVs are able to communicate directly with CSs (e.g. using Wi-Fi
Direct or Bluetooth).
3. EV-A2: EVs are able to communicate with the mobile device of their
user.
• ER:
1. ER-A1: Multiple ERs can have agreements with a DSO within the same
district. This extends the scenario implemented in the SOFIE Italian
pilot, where the auction for an energy flexibility request can be won only
by one ER.
2. ER-A2: ERs have a publicly accessible (e.g. stored on a distributed
ledger) identity defined by a DID and its associated DID Document. This
document defines the signing keys used by the ER to sign credentials
and verification keys used by the other parties to verify those signatures.
The DID Document also describes the ER endpoint or endpoints that the
other parties need to use to communicate with it.
5.2 Architecture specification
This section presents the different interactions designed in the architecture and the
message flow between the parties involved at each step. The interactions on the
energy marketplace are outside the scope of this thesis, so the architecture will not
include those interactions, even though the content of each energy flexibility request
(i.e. the amount of energy to charge, the district information and the time limit) has
been considered in the design of the architecture. For an ER to be able to prove
that it fulfilled an energy flexibility request published by the DSO, it must be able
to prove that a certain amount of energy has been charged within a specific district
within the specified time frame. No other information is required, such as the specific
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CS or the specific user involved. This proof must contain a set of transactions that,
when evaluated, sum up to the total amount of energy that needed to be taken out
of the grid, as requested by the DSO.
As specified in the requirements in Section 1.2.1, transactions must be verifiable,
meaning that each party can independently verify that each transaction has taken
place. The DSO must be able to verify that the total amount of energy requested
to be released has indeed been supplied by the ER. The ER must be able to verify
that its customer EVUs have charged within a specific district, and also to identify
the CSO of each CS involved in the charging transactions, for billing purposes. The
CSO must be able to identify the ER of which the EVU involved in each charging
transaction is a customer of, to bill it accordingly.
The architecture relies heavily on the usage of single-use DIDs to enable security
and privacy between any two parties. For instance, in a charging transaction involving
a CS and an EV communicating with each other, the two entities each create a
temporary pairwise DID. Using a different pairwise DID for each communication
eliminates possible correlation attacks so that it is theoretically impossible for an
external attacker to derive whether two different pairwise DIDs belong to the same
entity.
5.2.1 UC-1: EVU on-boarding
The interaction, shown in Fig 10, takes place every time an EVU signs a contract
with an ER that needs to initiate a new customer-provider relationship. Once the
two parties sign the contract (this event is not part of the protocol, and it can happen
either online or offline) the on-boarding of the EVU can start. This process is
repeated for each ER the EVU becomes a customer of.
EVU ER
2)	Create	did@ER:EVU
Connection	creation
3)	Connection	request
4)	Create	did@EVU:ER
5)	Connection	response
1)	Connection	invitation
Figure 10: Message flow for on-boarding a new EVU as customer of a specific ER
(UC-1).
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The message flow is the following:
1. Connection invitation: this step involves the EVU communicating to the ER
his/her intention to be issued a digital customer credential. Since the EVU
and ER still do not know each other’s endpoints, this message must be sent by
the EVU to the ER over a traditional communication channel, preferably a
secure one, to a well-known endpoint controlled by the ER. For instance, this
message can be sent as a GET request to an HTTPS endpoint owned by the
ER.
2. Create did@ER:EVU : upon receiving a connection invitation, the ER endpoint
creates a new, unique pairwise DID that will be used only when communicating
with the EVU. This DID will then be used by the EVU to encrypt future
traffic addressed to the ER by using the ER public encryption key specified
in its DID and to authenticate messages received by the ER by using the ER
public verification key, also specified in the DID.
3. Connection request: the ER sends a connection request to the EVU. This
message is sent to the EVU over the same channel used by the EVU in Step 1.
The connection request message includes information about the DID created
in Step 2 by the ER.
4. Create did@EVU:ER: upon receiving a connection request, the EVU endpoint
creates a new, unique pairwise DID that will be used only to communicate
with the ER endpoint.
5. Connection response: at this step, the EVU knows the pairwise DID used by
the ER (received in step 3). The EVU can then encrypt the traffic using the
public encryption keys specified in the DID received by the ER and sign it with
the private signing key associated with its own pairwise DID. Furthermore, the
DID also specifies the endpoint that the ER will use in the communication with
the EVU, hence the EVU can start sending all the future messages, including
the connection response, addressed to the ER to that endpoint, for instance a
REST or SOAP service. The connection response contains the details about
the EVU’s DID, which also includes a public verification key that the ER can
use to check the signature of the connection response message just received and
of all the future messages sent by the EVU. After this step, an end-to-end
encrypted connection has been created between EVU and ER, and
the communication will take place between the endpoints specified
in the DIDs.
5.2.2 UC-2: CS on-boarding to CSO
The interaction, shown in Fig 11 takes place every time a new CS is deployed by a
CSO and if the ownership of a CS changes from one CSO to another. The message
flow is very similar to the previous case of on-boarding an EVU and his/her EV.
Furthermore, it is assumed that a credential definition for the credential issued to
53
CS by the CSO has already been created and is publicly accessible. The goal of this
interaction is to create an encrypted communication channel between the CS and
the CSO endpoint and to generate a credential for the CS stating that it is owned by
the CSO.
CS CSO
2)	Create	did@CSO:CS
Connection	creation
3)	Connection	request
4)	Create	did@CS:CSO
5)	Connection	response
6)	Credential	offer
7)	Credential	request
8)	Credential
1)	Connection	invitation
Figure 11: Message flow for on-boarding a new CS owned by a specific CSO (UC-2).
1. Connection invitation: this step involves the CS communicating to the CSO its
intention to be on-boarded into the ecosystem. As with the EVU on-boarding,
this message can be sent over any communication channel, preferably a secure
one.
2. Create did@CSO:CS : the CSO endpoint creates a new, unique pairwise DID
that will be used only when communicating with the CS endpoint.
3. Connection request: the CSO sends a connection request to the CS via the
same channel used in step 1.
4. Create did@CS:CSO: upon receiving a connection request, the CS endpoint
creates a new, unique pairwise DID that will be used only when communicating
with the CSO endpoint.
5. Connection response: the CS sends a connection response encrypted with
the CSO pairwise DID encryption key and signed with the private signing
key associated with its pairwise DID. After this step, an end-to-end
encrypted connection has been created between CS and CSO, and
the communication will take place between the endpoints specified
in the DID.
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6. Credential offer : the CSO creates a credential offer for the CS. A credential
offer contains references to the credential definition and the credential schema
which the credential will conform to. Hence, a credential offer is created by
the CSO to communicate to the CS what type of credential the CSO can issue,
and what are the attributes that will be included in the credential. In this case,
the credential will contain information about the owner of the charging station.
7. Credential request: the credential definition and schema included in a credential
offer can be validated by the CS, i.e. the CS can make sure that the attributes in
the credential are the ones the credential is supposed to have. Upon successful
validation of the credential offer, the CS requests the credential with a credential
request.
8. Credential: the CSO generates and issues the credential to the EVU. The
credential is depicted in Listing 1, in Appendix A, and is signed with the signing
key associated with the CSO public DID.
5.2.3 UC-3: CS registration with DSO
The interaction takes place after the CS has been correctly on-boarded by the CSO,
which happens in UC-2. The interaction is shown in Fig 12. The registration
happens between the CS and the DSO and is needed by the CS to receive a credential
containing the district information that the CS will then use when interacting with
EVs. The assumptions are that the schema and definition of the new credential that
is going to be issued are already stored and publicly accessible.
1. Connection invitation: same as the previous use case.
2. Create did@DSO:CS : same as the previous use case.
3. Connection request: same as the previous use case.
4. Create did@CS:DSO: same as the previous use case.
5. Connection response: same as the previous use case.
6. Proof request: the DSO sends to the CS a proof request asking to show a valid
credential defining the ownership of the CS. The proof also asks to include
other CS-specific information (e.g. the authentic value of the smart meter
identifier, perhaps obtained by a trusted module part of the CS) so that the
DSO can issue a credential containing the right district identifier. Even though
the proof of ownership is not strictly required by the DSO to issue a credential,
it mitigates some types of attacks that might take place during the registration
of a CS. For instance, if no proof is requested, any actor with a valid CS
identifier, or any other details used at registration time, might register itself to
the DSO as a valid CS in a specific district. On the other hand, the request
of a valid proof about the CSO owning a CS allows the DSO to be sure that
the entity asking for a district credential is indeed a valid CS. Hence, the risks
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CS DSO
2)	Create	did@DSO:CS
Connection	creation
3)	Connection	request
4)	Create	did@CS:DSO
5)	Connection	response
8)	Credential	offer
9)	Credential	request
10)	Credential
6)	Proof	request
7)	Proof
1)	Connection	invitation
Figure 12: Message flow for registering a new CS as located within a certain district
(UC-3).
of impersonation attacks are reduced, as long as the CS itself does not act
maliciously for some other reasons.
7. Proof : the CS creates a verifiable presentation fulfilling the proof request and
sends it back to the DSO for verification.
8. Credential offer : the DSO verifies that the CSO owning the CS is among its
customers and, if the proof is successfully verified, the DSO sends to the CS a
credential offer that makes it possible for the CS to obtain the district-identifying
credential.
9. Credential request: same as previous cases.
10. Credential: the DSO sends to the CS the verifiable credential containing the
district identifier for the CS. This credential will be used to interact with EVs.
The credential is depicted in Listing 2, in Appendix A, and is signed with the
signing key associated with the DSO public DID.
5.2.4 UC-4: Charging credentials generation
The purpose is for the EVUs to collect credentials from the ERs that will allow them
to charge their EVUs during the day at the CSs that the ERs have an agreement
with. The process can be repeated for each needed ER, and it uses the encrypted
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connection channel that had been established upon EVU on-boarding in UC-1 with
each of the ERs. Since these credentials are short-lived (e.g. expire at the end of the
day in which they have been issued), ideally this transaction could take place at the
beginning of each day in which the EVU thinks he/she is going to make use of them.
There is no consequence if the charging credentials are issued and are never used
or expire. As with UC-2 and UC-3, it is assumed that all the ERs issuing charging
credentials have a public identity which is used to sign the credentials and later to
verify those signatures. The flow is shown in Fig 13.
EVU ER
Existing	connection
1)	Create	did@EVU:CS
3)	Credential	offer
2)	Credential	pre-request
4)	Credential	request	+	pairwise	DID
5)	Credential
iterative
iterative
Figure 13: Message flow for an EVU to obtain charging credentials from its ER
(UC-4).
1. Create did@EVU:CS : this is one of the fundamental steps to keep the identity
of the EVU protected. The EVU generates as many pairwise DIDs as the
number of credentials he or she is willing to be issued. The credentials can be
used in charging transactions with CSs to prove the validity of the customer-
provider relationship between the EVU and the ER. Even though the
EVU is not forbidden to re-use the same DID and credential twice,
this is highly discouraged to reduce the probabilities of successful
correlation attacks.
2. Credentials pre-request: for each credential that the EVU wants the ER to
issue, the EVU pings the ER endpoint (specified in the ER pairwise DID
for the EVU-ER connection established in UC-1) to trigger a new credential
offer-request-issuance iteration. No specific information is sent at this step.
3. Credential offer : the ER creates a new credential offer for each credential that
needs to be issued. This is mainly done to avoid replay attacks (each credential
offer has a nonce attribute). Nevertheless, the whole process can be achieved by
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exchanging only one, larger message, containing the information about all the
credentials that will be issued. In this case, the credential pre-request message
at the previous step needs to specify the number of credentials that the EVU
wants the ER to issue.
4. Credential request + pairwise DID: the EVU requests the ER to issue a
charging credential (credential request) having as subject one of the pairwise
DIDs generated at Step 1.
5. Credential: the ER issues the credential linked to the DID specified in the
previous step. The credential will contain the information that the credential
subject DID is a customer of the specific ER, as shown in Listing 3, in Appendix
A. The credential is short-lived and not revocable.
5.2.5 UC-5: Charging event
The interaction, shown in Fig 14, takes place every time an EV needs to charge
at a CS. Here the assumption is that there is an offline communication channel
(either unicast or broadcast) between the CS and the EV. Furthermore, if the
communication channel relies on static identifiers (e.g. MAC addresses),
such addresses need to be randomised before each interaction starts, so
that the same EV cannot be linked by the CS and vice versa. It is also
assumed that EVU and EV can communicate via a previously-secured communication
channel (e.g. via Bluetooth pairing) and that they have also agreed on which of the
several DIDs previously generated and registered with the ER during interaction
UC-4 will be used in this interaction.
The charging interaction relies on a series of key points. First, the protocol for
charging is manually triggered by a user. This is done because it reduces the vector
of attacks by making the communication bootstrapping between EV and CS more
secure. It is also done so that the CS does not need to be constantly advertising
information, but can advertise on-purpose whenever triggered by a valid (as explained
later) human interaction.
Second, even in case the rest of the messages (other than the first human-triggered
interaction) are broadcast between the EV and the CS, they are encrypted using
each other’s public encryption key, as specified in their DIDs. In this way, malicious
actors cannot decrypt the content of the messages being broadcast, even though they
might be able to capture them. This is also why the first step in the protocol, the
human trigger, happens using a near-range communication channel (e.g. QRCode
scanning or NFC tapping). In this way, there is no initial information advertised in
clear, and the privacy of both the EV (and its EVU) and the CS can be guaranteed.
Third, during the actual exchange of electrical energy from the CS to the EV,
there is a continuous exchange of signed data between the two parties. In this way,
an EV can send signed requests for small units of energy (e.g. every kWh), and the
CS can return signed responses that the energy required has been provided, similarly
to the solution presented in the POPCORN protocol paper [34]. If either of the
parties stops following the protocol, the communication can be interrupted, while
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the total supply of energy up to that moment can still be proved due to the signed
messages that the two entities have previously exchanged. The EV can suffer a small
loss if the last request is not fulfilled by the CS, i.e. if the CS does not supply energy
for the last signed request by the EV. The maximum amount of the loss depends on
the amount of energy supplied within each signed block.
EV CS CSO ER
1)	Send	connection
request	+	credential
2)	Create	did@CS:EV
3)	Advertise
connection	response
4)	Advertise	connection
ack	+	proof	request
5)	Advertise	proof
6)	Advertise	signed	unit
of	charge
7)	Advertise	signed	charge
confirmation
8)	Send	CSO	proof	of
charge	for	EV 9)	Send	ER	proof	of
charge	for	CS
EVU
Connection	creation
iterative
Figure 14: Message flow for a charging event (UC-5).
1. Send connection request + credential: this step requires the physical interaction
of the EV owner that needs to get close to the CS and trigger the protocol.
The action could be the reading of a QRCode by the CS or the tapping of an
NFC device from the EVU to the CS reader, assuming the reader is properly
secured. Such information is then embedded into the connection request and
encoded in a format that depends on the communication channel used. In order
to reduce the number of messages exchanged, and also to reduce the chances
for malicious users to interact with a CS without being a customer of any of
the ER authorised to use the CS, the message contains also the credential
proving that the used DID has been issued a credential by an ER which has
authority to use that CS to offer its services. Hence, the connection request
(to create an encrypted communication channel) along with the credential (to
short-circuit interaction with malicious users) is sent by the EVU to the CS
using a near-distance communication channel, making it difficult for malicious
users to alter or read the content of the message, which is exchanged in clear.
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2. Create did@CS:EV : once the protocol has been initiated, the CS creates a new
pairwise DID used only within the scope of the current charging event.
3. Advertise connection response: since the CS has the information about the
DID used by the EV in the interaction, it can advertise encrypted data using
the encryption key specified. In this step, the CS advertises the connection
response, which makes it possible for the EV to assign a temporary identity to
the CS (based on the temporary DID the CS has generated for this interaction),
encrypt the traffic broadcast but addressed to it, and authenticate the traffic
broadcast by it.
4. Advertise connection ack + proof request: from now on, a logical communication
channel has been set: the traffic, even though broadcast, is encrypted and
cannot be altered/understood by third parties. At this point, the EV sends
back a connection ack along with a request for proof from the CS proving
information about its owner as well as the district which the CS belongs to.
5. Advertise proof : the CS answers back by building and sending the requested
proof, built from the credential obtained at on-boarding time by the CSO
(UC-2) and registration time by the DSO (UC-3).
6. Advertise signed unit of charge: this step, as the next one, is repeated
several times, assuming both CS and EV successfully verify the in-
formation sent to each other in the previous iteration. Each message
is denoted with SREQi, where i represents the position of the message within
the collection of messages sent by the EV to the CS. Each SREQi contains the
information about both DIDs used in the interaction, the amount of energy
requested in this iteration, the timestamp, and the district information. The
information is signed by the EV by using the private signing key associated
with its pairwise DID. At the end, when the n messages are collected by the
CS, it has undeniable proof of the total amount of energy requested by the EV
during the specific charging interaction.
7. Advertise signed charge confirmation: each message is denoted with SRESi.
Each SRESi contains the same information as SREQi, but it is signed by the
CS instead of the EV. When collected by the EV, it has undeniable proof of
the total amount of energy supplied by the CS during the specific charging
interaction.
8. Send CSO proof of charge for EV : once the EV has charged the amount of
energy it needed, the communication between the CS and the EV interrupts.
The CS then sends to the CSO endpoint all the n SREQi and SRESi, the charging
certificate EVER, and the two proofs built to prove CSO ownership and district
information. The information is not sent directly to the ER both because of
possible information leakage deriving from an Internet-based communication,
and also because there is no direct trust relationship between the CS and the
ER, since the single CSs are indistinguishable to the ER, as this is one of the
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goals of the protocol. The transaction-related information is stored by the CSO
for possible dispute resolution, since it is enough to prove that the transaction
took place (the EV has signed several micro-transactions) and that the EV
was a customer of the ER (the charging certificate EVER proves it).
9. Send ER proof of charge for CS : upon receiving the transaction details from
the CS, the CSO forwards them to the ER for billing purposes.
At the end of the charging transaction:
• ER: can prove to the DSO that a certain amount of energy (the sum of the
energy charged in all the micro-transactions) has been charged in a district
(the proof built by the CS about its district identifier) within a specific time
frame (the timestamp in the micro-transactions). Such proof does not leak any
information about the specific CSs or EVs involved in the charging interactions.
• CSO: can prove and bill the ER for the service since it can prove that a certain
amount of energy (the sum of the energy charged in all the micro-transactions)
has been charged to an EV belonging to the ER (the charging certificate
presented by the EVU in Step 1) at a CS belonging to that CSO (the proof
built by the CS, which has also been verified by the EV during the transaction).
Furthermore, being serialised in a machine-readable format, the verification of
the transactions can be performed in an automated fashion, e.g. by a smart contract,
which could then issue the agreed amount of rewards to the ER.
5.3 Privacy considerations
As shown in Fig. 15, the privacy of the solution is ensured by the fact that the system
is logically divided into three areas of knowledge: the area of CSs and CSOs, the
area of EVs/EVUs and ERs, and the area of the DSOs. By using temporary DIDs,
and making the binding of those DIDs to real identities known only to the entities
within the same area of knowledge, the privacy of the identities can be guaranteed
if this binding is not made known to entities in other areas. For instance, after
every charging transaction, a CS sends to its CSO the details about the charging
transaction.
We assume that the CSO knows the real identity of the CSs it owns, and by
having access to the transaction data for each charging event, it also knows the
temporary identity that each of the CSs has used. Hence, the CSO can exactly say
which CS was involved in which charging transaction. Nevertheless, neither a CS
nor a CSO can derive the identity of the EVU involved in the transaction.
In the same way, an ER issues charging credentials to temporary DIDs created by
its customer EVs, hence it has complete knowledge about the mapping between an
EVU identity and all the DIDs generated (to which the credentials are issued). When
receiving charging transaction details from the CSO, the ER is then able to derive
the real identity of the EVUs involved in the charging transaction, since they will be
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Figure 15: The different knowledge domains of the use case described. Solid arrows
indicate personally identifiable information. Dashed arrows indicate information that
do not relate to a single entity (either CS or EV).
billed accordingly, but has no knowledge about the CS involved. Since single-use
DIDs are used, the ER cannot link two different charging events to the same CS,
but only determine the district in which the charging event has taken place.
With regard to the DSO, from the transaction details it receives, it cannot derive
any useful information about the real identity of the CS nor of the EV (and hence of
its EVU) involved, but only the district in which the transaction took place and the
ER the EVU involved in the transaction is a customer of. It is worth pointing out
that the DSO can still identify the specific CS involved in each charging
transaction by comparing the consumption data from the smart meters
installed on those CSs with the information in the charging transactions
it receives. Nevertheless, such information does not affect the privacy of
the EVUs, who are still protected from both the CSO and the DSO, as
long as his/her ERs do not collude with them. The different knowledge that
each party gains at the end of a charging event is shown in Table 3.
This separation of concerns can be compared to the Principle of Least Privilege
(PoLP) widely used in the IT security field [59]. The Principle of Least Privilege
requires that every subject (e.g. a process, a program or a user) must be able to
access only the information and the resources that are necessary to accomplish its
task.
In the architecture presented, by preventing cross-domain information flow, we
ensure that each subject has only limited knowledge of the system transactions and
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- CS EV TRANSACTION INFO
CSO - CS real identity
- ER providing the
charging service
- EV pseudo-identity
- charging amount
- charging time
- district identifier
ER
- CS pseudo-identity
- CSO owning the CS
providing the charge
- EV real identity
- charging amount
- charging time
- district identifier
DSO - CS real identity - EV pseudo-identity
- charging amount
- charging time
- district identifier
Table 3: Table representing the knowledge that the main actors of the system, DSO,
CSO, and ER, acquire after a charging transaction is completed between a CS and an
EV. Rows represent the entities acquiring new information, while columns represent
entities about which new information is obtained.
cannot threaten the privacy of the subjects (or entities) for which it is not responsible.
This is why the assumption GEN-A1, presented in Section 5.1.1, has been
made about the different parties not colluding with each other: if there is cross-
border information flow of personally identifying information, each party can obtain
knowledge of the entire system, since the knowledge it gets from the other domains
can be combined with its knowledge.
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6 Analysis
This section evaluates how the solution proposed in the previous section satisfies the
privacy and business requirements listed in Section 1.2.1. Furthermore, this section
contains answers to the research questions presented in Section 1.3.
6.1 Privacy and business requirements
Overall, the use case has been made very general and flexible and therefore it can be
implemented in several different scenarios: CSs can change their owner (CSO) during
their lifetime; EVs can be customers of several ERs simultaneously; ERs can sign
agreements with several CSOs at the same time, even within the same district; CSOs
can have agreements with several ERs at the same time: the agreements specify in
which energy districts the ERs can use the CSs owned by the CSO to provide their
services.
Furthermore, when a party obtains some information about a charging
transaction, such information must be authentic, i.e. it must be verifiable
and the parties involved cannot repudiate their participation to the trans-
action.
6.1.1 PR1 + BR1
PR1: The DSO MUST NOT be able to identify specific EVUs.
BR1: The DSO MUST be able to understand how much each ER has participated
in maintaining grid stability in relation to the agreements for the energy flexibility
requests.
The PR1 has been set to protect the privacy of the EVUs against the distribution
system operator (DSO). The only concern of the DSO is to reward the energy retailers
(ERs) that successfully fulfil an energy flexibility request. For this reason, the only
information they need to have access to, for each charging transaction, is the amount
of energy charged, the district in which the charging event took place, and the ER
allowing the EVU to charge in this transaction, i.e. the ER providing the charging
service to the EVU. If the DSO obtains such information, the architecture would
also be compliant with the business requirement BR1. Even though the descriptions
of the various interactions (UC-1 to UC-5) do not describe the verification process
by the DSO, the architecture and the information flow have been designed in a way
that makes the process relatively straightforward to implement.
The proposed solution fulfils PR1 by only granting the DSO access to a subset of
the whole energy transaction information, which is sent by the ER willing to prove
its contribution to the energy grid balancing and hence to obtain the agreed rewards.
One element of information that the DSO has access to is the amount of energy
charged during the transaction. This information is double-signed by both the CS
and the EV involved in the transaction (in steps 6 and 7 of UC-5). The DSO can be
sure the signatures are authentic because for each charging interaction it also receives,
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from the ER, the certificates and the proofs used in the transaction. Specifically, the
DSO receives the proof built by the CS proving to the EV its district identifier and
the charging certificate (issued by the ER) used by the EV to show to the CS it has
the authorisation to charge at that CS.
By matching the two DIDs (of the EV and the CS) used to sign the charging
amounts with the ones used both in the district proof and the charging certificate,
the DSO can be sure that 1. the CS involved in the transaction is located in a specific
district and 2. the EV involved in the transaction belongs to a specific ER.
The solution is designed to allow the DSO to verify contributions by the ERs
without having access to the real identities of the EVs involved in the charging
transactions. Hence, the verification process does not leak any information about the
EV involved in the charging transaction other than the single-use DID used in the
transaction which, if not re-used in any other transaction, does not make correlation
or de-anonymising attacks any easier to implement. This condition is true even
if the DSO can identify the CS involved in the charging transaction by
comparing the amount of energy charged in the transaction with the
smart meter readings of the energy grid it has access to. Even by having
information about the specific CS involved, the DSO still cannot identify
the specific EVU, unless external tools are used (e.g. cameras that allow
mapping CSs, timestamps and temporary DIDs to a specific car and
registration plate).
6.1.2 PR2 and PR3 + BR3 and BR4
PR2: A CSO and its CSs MUST NOT be able to identify a specific EVU engaged
in a charging event.
PR3: A CSO and its CSs MUST NOT be able to infer that the same EVU has taken
part in two different charging events.
BR3: CSOs are paid by ERs based on the charging services provided through any
of their CSs. For this reason, CSOs MUST be able to claim payments from ERs
by proving the authenticity of the charging events involving such CSs and the ER
customers.
BR4: CSs MUST always verify that an EV is authorised to perform a certain
charging operation before letting the EV charge for the agreed amount of energy.
The PR2 and PR3 have been set to protect the privacy of the EVUs against the
CSO, assuming the ER and the CSO roles are not fulfilled by the same entity. The
only information a CSO is supposed to obtain from a charging transaction is the
amount of energy charged and the ER involved, through the EVU, in the charging
transaction (for billing purposes). The information obtained by the CSO makes the
architecture compliant with the business requirements BR3 and BR4.
The proposed solution addresses PR2 and PR3 by using single-use DIDs and
masquerading the network identifiers used in the communication between the CS
and the EV. These measures allow the EVUs to hide their real identity and make it
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very difficult to implement correlation attacks since each new interaction will involve
a new DID and new network identifiers for their EVs.
Nevertheless, the CSO can still obtain reliable information regarding the transac-
tion, i.e. it can be sure that an EVU belongs to a certain ER by using the charging
certificate presented by the EVU during step 1 of UC-5. In the same way, as done by
the DSO, the CSO can also reliably obtain the total amount charged by verifying the
double signature used for each micro-charge transaction event. Furthermore, similarly
as described above, the use of external means to gather additional information about
the charging EVUs, e.g. cameras, represents a potential threat but is out of the
scope of this thesis.
6.1.3 PR4 and PR5 + BR2 and BR5
PR4: A ER MUST NOT be able to infer that the same CS has taken part in two
different charging events.
PR5: An ER MUST NOT be able to link its customers’ charging events to specific
CSs, but only to specific districts.
BR2: ERs bill their customers in a postpaid fashion, thus they MUST be able to
monitor how much energy each EVU has charged over the billing period.
BR5: EVUs COULD get some kind of reward from their ER every time they
contribute to the grid balancing.
The PR4 and PR5 have been set to partially protect the privacy of EVUs against
their ERs, with the same assumption that ER and CSO roles are not fulfilled by the
same entity. The only information that an ER is supposed to obtain from a charging
transaction is the amount of energy charged, the district in which the charging
interaction took place (to charge the EVU involved and to possibly issue additional
rewards) and the CSO owning the CS used for the charge by the EVU (to verify the
authenticity of the bills from the CSO). The information obtained by the ER makes
the architecture compliant with the business requirements BR2 and BR5.
The proposed solution addresses PR4 and PR5 by using single-use DIDs and
fine-grained certificates. These measures prevent the ER to 1. gather knowledge
about a specific CS involved in the transaction (it only receives information about
the district in which the transaction took place and the CSO owning that CS) and
2. derive patterns for its customer EVUs, since CSs always use different identifiers,
making linkage across charging transactions harder.
Nevertheless, the ER can still obtain reliable information regarding the transaction,
i.e. it can be sure that one of its customers has charged a specific amount of energy in
a specific district. The specific customer is identified by the charging certificate used
in the transaction, while the district information is obtained with the district proof
sent by the CS to the EV in step 5 of UC-5. Furthermore, by verifying the signatures
of the micro-charges, the ER can reliably obtain the total amount of energy supplied
in the charging interaction.
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6.1.4 PR6
PR6: Communication between the different parties (e.g. between EV and CS, or
between CS and ER) MUST NOT leak more information than needed that would
make correlation attacks against the EVUs easier (e.g. network-layer identifiers such
as IP and MAC addresses).
The PR6 has been set to prevent that all the measures taken to fulfil the previous
privacy requirements are invalidated. As also noted in some of the related works
analysed, side-channel information leaks deriving from static network identifiers have
usually been underestimated. Nevertheless, in a privacy-sensitive context and, more
importantly, in a privacy-preserving solution, such issues must be addressed. For
this reason, in UC-5 (in steps 2 to 7), the communication between the CS and the
EV hides the real network identifiers used by masquerading them and randomising
them before every transaction.
From a performance point of view, masquerading network identifiers has no
impact of any kind, while it has very important and positive privacy implications.
6.2 Research questions
The design of the proposed architecture has made possible to answer the research
questions presented in Section 1.3.
6.2.1 RQ1
To what extent can the identity and location of the EVUs be protected, considering a
scenario in which such identity must be known by the ERs they are customers of?
The proposed architecture shows that the parties that know, for business reasons,
the identity of the EVUs involved in the charging transactions, such as the ERs, are
only able to locate those EVUs at a district level. On the other hand, the entities
that know the exact location of a charging event, e.g. by knowing the CS involved,
are not able to retrieve the identity of the EVU involved.
As mentioned above, the DSO does not obtain any information about the EVU
involved in a charging transaction, only district information, amount of charge,
timestamp of the transaction, and the ER involved. Similarly, the CSO does not
obtain any identifiable information from the charging interaction between one of
its CSs and an EV, only the amount of charge, the timestamp of the transaction,
and the ER involved in the transaction. The ER, on the other hand, does not
obtain any information that could lead to the identification of a specific CS, since
that information could be combined with the knowledge of the EVU involved in the
transaction and could breach the privacy that EVU should have. In particular, an
ER receives only information about the amount of charge, the timestamp of the
transaction, the district in which the transaction took place, and the CSO owning
the CS offering the charging service.
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Hence, the location of the EVUs is known only to the ERs that are involved in
charging transactions and only at the district level. On the other hand, the identity
of EVUs is kept hidden to CSO and DSO and is known, for billing purposes, to the
ER offering the charging service at the specific CS involved in the transaction.
6.2.2 RQ2
What are the possible relevant trade-offs between the privacy of an EVU and the
business requirements of the other parties involved, i.e. DSO, CSOs and especially
ERs?
Most of the business requirements that are desirable for EV charging scenarios
similar to the one presented in this thesis have been listed in Section 1.2.1 and the
presented solution addresses all of them.
Nevertheless, giving the possibility to an ER to know both the identity of the
EVUs in the transactions and the districts in which the transactions take place does
not yet entirely protect the privacy of the EVUs. Yet, the ERs would like to know at
least the district in which their customers charge, for instance, to derive patterns of
the most crowded districts and subsequently reaching agreements with more CSOs
to increase the offer in those districts.
It is not possible to enhance the identity privacy guarantees for the EVUs until the
business requirement BR2 is removed. The requirement specifies that the customers
of an ER are billed in a postpaid fashion, and for this reason, their identities in each
charging transaction need to be known to the ER. Since the ER is the only party in
the system that knows the real identities of the EVs, it is also the one in control of
the most sensitive information, thus the most sensitive target for attacks.
For this reason, a better privacy-preserving approach would require the EVs not
to share their real identities with any other party, including the ERs, so that they
would be responsible for preserving and managing their own identities.
To achieve this, a different billing scheme is required. One possible solution would
be to use anonymous payment schemes, e.g. some types of cryptocurrencies, and to
introduce a pay-per-use model where EVUs would be paying for their charges during
each charging transaction. Technologies such as smart contracts are very helpful to
automate the entire process so that each block of charge (in steps 6 and 7 of UC-5)
is unlocked only after the EV has paid for it, as suggested in [62].
By using an anonymous payment system and a pay-per-use model, the need for
the ER to know the identity of the EV involved in each transaction is removed. It is
enough for EVUs to build a proof that they are valid customers of a specific ER and
that they have paid for the charge to unlock the supply from the CS. The built proof
will still be used by the CSO to bill the ER for the service offered, but the identity
of the EV will remain unknown to all the parties involved and its participation in
different charging events will not be tracked over time.
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6.2.3 RQ3
How can the system be designed so that the DSO can reliably and automatically
evaluate the contribution of each of the ERs to the grid stability, without getting
access to the identities of the individual users charging?
Reliability is ensured by signing the charging data that is exchanged between the
EV and the CS during an interaction. Furthermore, in order for the signatures to be
verified, there is need for additional credentials and proofs showing that the entity
signing the data is either a certified CS belonging to a specific CSO (that the DSO
can then bill) or that the EVU is a customer of a specific ER (for rewards issuance
and future dispute resolution).
The machine-readable structure of the information exchanged among the parties
enables the automation of some of the processes. For instance, the verification of the
transactions can be performed in an automated fashion, e.g. by a smart contract that
could then issue the agreed amount of rewards to the ERs fulfilling energy flexibility
requests.
6.2.4 RQ4
How can charging events be logged and/or stored without revealing any personal
information so that it is still possible to rely on them for dispute resolution between
parties?
Auditability is one of the main properties that a system enabling interactions
among untrusted actors needs to guarantee. The relationships between the different
entities are regulated with contracts, so these entities are incentivised to behave fairly
most of the time, even though things might not always go as expected. Moreover, if
there is no dispute resolution mechanism in place, malicious parties would be able to
trick the system without being punished for doing so: a system in which such actors
are not punished for their actions would additionally lack the trust of the honest
parties that, as a result, would abandon the system.
One solution to solve disputes is to introduce a trusted central authority storing
all the transactions information and use it whenever needed. This approach is not
very different from the ones proposed in other research that has been analysed and
suffers from all the problems discussed in Sections 3.1 and 3.2.
Instead, a decentralised solution could be implemented in several ways. For
instance with the creation of a trusted storage space, e.g. a DLT, where all the
charging transactions could be stored and from where they could be retrieved and
verified, in case of disputes. Nevertheless, a decentralised storage solution raises
several concerns around data privacy, particularly if the data stored represents
sensitive information. Another approach might require each party to store and
manage the information it has access to, and present it when required by the system
or in case of disputes resolution.
The solution presented in this thesis enables the implementation of decentralised
solutions, since the data shared between parties does not represent, if taken inde-
pendently, any personal information. Specifically, the amount of the charge, the
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transaction timestamp, the district identifier and the temporary identities of EV and
CS cannot, alone, be used by the actors of the system to point to a specific transaction
involving a specific EV and a specific CS. Furthermore, since all the data that is
exchanged is signed (e.g. charging data, proofs, and credentials), all of the parties can
verify how much energy has been charged in a specific charging transaction without
the need of a trusted central authority guaranteeing the authenticity or integrity of
the data.
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7 Future Work
This section presents the work that will be completed in the future, such as an
evaluation of the performances of the system and the automation of some of the
interactions presented.
7.1 Implementation and performance evaluation
This thesis has presented the design of an architecture enhancing the privacy guaran-
tees of solutions currently used to mitigate electricity grid balance issues via scheduled
charging of electric vehicles (EVs). First, it enhances the privacy of EVs during their
interactions with the electricity grid. Second, it allows electric vehicles users (EVUs)
to contribute to the electricity grid stability without compromising their privacy.
Furthermore, the analysis carried out on the architecture has highlighted that it
fulfils all the privacy and business requirements presented in Section 1.2.1.
Nevertheless, no proof-of-concept (PoC) has been developed to measure and eval-
uate the performances of the proposed architecture. For this reason, the development
of a PoC using the Hyperledger Indy 2.1 framework could validate the claim that the
architecture and the usage of DIDs are suitable for the use case. Since Hyperledger
Indy uses a DLT as the underlying storage, the transactions within each use case
presented in Section 5.2 might be divided into the following groups: time taken
by the entities endpoints to perform computations (both cryptographic and not);
time taken by an endpoint to interact with the ledger to save/retrieve credentials,
schemas, and definitions; and time taken by any two endpoints to communicate
with each other. Specifically, the last operation can take place in two different
ways, either over the Internet (as in the case of CS-CSO communication) or using
machine-to-machine protocols such as Bluetooth and Wi-Fi Direct (as in the case of
CS-EV communication).
An implementation would allow measuring and categorising the time spent in
each operation within each transaction to identify possible bottlenecks. For instance,
if the generation of new DIDs by a party were to be identified as a bottleneck, then
single-use DIDs might be re-used in a small number of interactions before being
replaced by a new one.
7.2 Application to the SOFIE Energy Marketplace pilot
Among the related research considered, the SOFIE Decentralised Energy Flexibility
Marketplace pilot [63] implements a real-world scenario based on similar, albeit less
general, business relationships between distribution system operator (DSO), energy
retailers (ERs), which are defined as fleet managers (FMs) in the pilot, charging
stations (CSs), and electric vehicle users (EVUs) with their electric vehicles (EVs).
Hence, the application of the proposed architecture to the SOFIE Decentralised
Energy Flexibility Marketplace pilot can provide useful insights about the performance
of the system in a real-world scenario and not in a simulation, as is the case of the
previous section.
71
Even though not considered in the architecture, privacy-preserving identity tech-
nologies like decentralised identifiers (DIDs) can also be used in the interactions
between the different entities to prove claims about themselves and to obtain access to
some resources or services. For instance, the identities and the associated credentials
might be used in the energy flexibility marketplace to bind Ethereum addresses to
verified identities, if the access to the marketplace is regulated.
7.3 Automatic flexibility request fulfilment verification
The architecture has been designed to support the automation of as many processes
as possible. One of the interactions that would benefit the most from increased
automation is, as also pointed out at the end of Section 5.2.5, the verification, by
the DSO, of the fulfilment of an energy flexibility request by an ER.
At the end of each charging interaction, the relevant metadata is sent first from
the CS to the CSO, and then from the CSO to the ER. To prove the fulfilment of an
energy flexibility request, the ER needs then to show to the DSO the "receipts" of all
the charging transactions satisfying a particular energy flexibility request published
to obtain the agreed rewards.
Since all the data exchange is machine-readable, the verification process can
be automated in a way that prevents malicious behavior from either the DSO or
the ER. Specifically, a smart contract can be used to enforce that 1. the energy
flexibility request has been satisfied by the ER and 2. the correct number of rewards
are transferred from the CSO to the ER.
The deployment of a smart contract for each energy flexibility auction that has
been won by an ER and hence closed makes sure that its logic cannot be altered
after the deployment and that it is verifiable by all the interested parties (in this
case the DSO and the ER). The business rules specified in the contract are enforced
fairly thanks to the security provided by the underlying DLT network.
Furthermore, the usage of smart contracts reduces to a large extent the workload
requested to the DSO since it does not need to maintain any active endpoint to verify
that each energy flexibility request has been fulfilled by the winning ER. Instead,
the DSO just needs to make sure (when an energy flexibility request is won by
and assigned to an ER) that the deployed smart contract correctly implements the
business rules for the rewarding mechanism. Then, it is the ER’s job to submit the
receipts of the charging event to the smart contract to receive the rewards, without
the need for the DSO to intervene.
7.4 Adoption of a privacy-preserving payment scheme
As a further improvement to the privacy of EVUs, the system could implement a
payment system that would allow EVUs to pay for their charges without revealing
their identity to any other parties, ERs included. Most businesses today are still
reluctant to accept payments different than the traditional ones, i.e. debit/credit
cards or cash. Nevertheless, there are several privacy-preserving payment solutions,
mostly based on blockchain, that would allow EVUs to pay their ERs for the services
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they use following a pay-per-charge model. The adoption of a privacy-preserving
payment scheme would allow EVUs to pay for their charges without revealing their
identities to the ERs, which is what happens in the proposed architecture due to the
business requirements.
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8 Conclusions
This thesis has presented an architecture enhancing the privacy guarantees of solutions
currently used to mitigate electricity grid balance issues via scheduled charging of
electric vehicles (EVs). Specifically, the information about charging transactions has
been divided into different knowledge domains so that only the minimum amount of
information needed crosses any domain border.
Section 1.2.1 lists the privacy and business requirements the final solution had
to fulfil, while Section 5 introduces the architecture and lists the assumptions made
during its design. To make the architecture applicable to a wide set of use cases in
the sector, only the minimum needed number of business requirements have been
made. On the other hand, the privacy requirements set make sure that the solution
properly addresses the privacy needs of the EVUs.
The thesis has also analysed previous research performed in the field. The main
points resulting from the literature review are that:
• Most of the solutions rely on centralised components for some critical tasks
such as key material distribution and identities verification.
• Most of the solutions do not properly address side-channel information leaks
deriving from communications taking place over the Internet. Long-lived (e.g.
IP addresses) and permanent (e.g. MAC addresses) identifiers are as dangerous
to the privacy of an entity as other types of static system-specific identifiers.
For the above reasons, the architecture designed uses privacy-enhancing and
decentralised technologies such as decentralised identifiers (DIDs) and verifiable
credentials (VCs). Furthermore, the communication involving entities whose identity
needs to be protected (i.e. EVs) and other parties is reduced to the minimum needed.
The network identifiers used in these communications are properly masqueraded and
frequently randomised so as not to compromise the additional security and privacy
provided by DIDs and VCs.
Because of its similarity in terms of business requirements and relationships
between the different actors, the SOFIE Decentralised Energy Flexibility Marketplace
pilot [63], developed within the context of the SOFIE18 project, has been used as
the starting point for the development of the architecture presented in this thesis.
Nevertheless, as considered during its analysis, the pilot does not properly address
the privacy needs of the EVUs and makes some assumptions that reduce the deploy-
ability of the resulting system in more general contexts. However, because of its
similarity with the architecture designed, the pilot has been considered as a suitable
candidate to implement (by using the Hyperledger Indy framework) and apply the
architecture presented in this thesis and test its performances in a real-world scenario.
Aspects of the pilot such as marketplace interactions, charging transactions, and
verification of energy flexibility request fulfilment would all benefit from the adoption
of the proposed solution, in terms of increased privacy for the EVUs, increased levels
18https://sofie-iot.eu
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of automation for some processes and increased deployability for more general and
complex use cases.
Generally speaking, the solution presented in this work solves the issue of having
a trusted centralised authority for most privacy-sensitive operations. The presence of
a central authority represents a sensitive target from the information security point
of view, and it might also represent a bottleneck for the performance of the system.
Still, even with no central authority knowing all or most of the interactions taking
place within the system, the architecture has been designed to ensure authenticity
and reliability of the information exchanged.
In particular, since the use case considered involves different independent parties
(with some not sharing any kind of trust), the system still ensures that disputes can
be fairly solved by simply relying on past transactions. For instance, a DSO can
reliably verify the contribution that an ER has made to the grid balance by analysing
charging transactions within a specific time scope involving the customers of that
ER, without threatening the privacy of those customers.
By deploying the proposed architecture in real-world use cases, EVUs will still be
able to benefit from the incentives that DSOs will still make available to balance their
energy grid. Furthermore, EVUs do not have to give away their privacy anymore
to benefit from those incentives, as is the case with many other service providers
that make heavy use of user data to offer customised solutions. On the other hand,
businesses such as DSOs, CSOs and ERs can profit in a more ethical way that
does not profile end users and does not make them targets for profiling activities.
Moreover, by decentralising the management of each user’s information and keying
material, charging interactions solely and entirely depend on the entities interacting,
i.e. CSs, EVs and EVUs, without relying on the services provided by an external,
third-party entity that could represent potential single points of failure for the system
availability.
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A Credential definitions
1 {
2 "@context": [
3 "https ://energy -ecosystem/credentials/cs-onboarding/v1"
4 ],
5 "id": "https ://cso.energy -ecosystem.org/credentials /1",
6 "type": ["VerifiableCredential", "CSOnboardingCredential"],
7 "credentialSubject": {
8 "id": "did:example:CS_1",
9 "CSO": "did:example:CSO_Public"
10 },
11 "issuer": "did:example:CSO_Public",
12 "issuanceDate": "2010 -01 -01 T19 :23:24Z",
13 "proof": {
14 "type": "RsaSignature2018",
15 "creator": "did:example:CSO_Public",
16 "created": "2010 -01 -01 T19 :23:25Z",
17 "nonce": "2bbgh3dgjg2302d -d2b3gi423d42",
18 "proofValue": "eyJ0eXAiOiJK ... gFWFOEjXk",
19 }
20 }
Listing 1: Example of a credential issued from CSO to a CS during UC-2. DIDs
are used as identifiers in the example. An example of Linked Data proof is given
in the proof section. The CSO uses its public identity to make the signature of the
credential verifiable.
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1 {
2 "@context": [
3 "https ://energy -ecosystem/credentials/cs-registration/v1"
4 ],
5 "id": "https ://dso.energy -ecosystem.org/credentials /1",
6 "type": ["VerifiableCredential", "CSRegistrationCredential"],
7 "credentialSubject": {
8 "id": "did:example:CS_1",
9 "district_id": "13"
10 },
11 "issuer": "did:example:DSO_Public",
12 "issuanceDate": "2010 -01 -01 T19 :23:24Z",
13 "proof": {
14 "type": "RsaSignature2018",
15 "creator": "did:example:DSO_Public",
16 "created": "2010 -01 -01 T19 :23:25Z",
17 "nonce": "2bbgh3dgjg2302d -d2b3gi423d42",
18 "proofValue": "eyJ0eXAiOiJK ... gFWFOEjXk",
19 }
20 }
Listing 2: Example of a credential issued from DSO to a CS during UC-3. DIDs
are used as identifiers in the example. An example of Linked Data proof is given
in the proof section. The DSO uses its public identity to make the signature of the
credential verifiable.
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1 {
2 "@context": [
3 "https ://energy -ecosystem/credentials/ev-charging/v1"
4 ],
5 "id": "https ://er.energy -ecosystem.org/credentials /1",
6 "type": ["VerifiableCredential", "EVChargingCredential"],
7 "credentialSubject": {
8 "id": "did:example:EV_1",
9 "ER": "did:example:ER_Public"
10 },
11 "issuer": "did:example:ER_Public",
12 "issuanceDate": "2010 -01 -01 T19 :23:24Z",
13 "proof": {
14 "type": "RsaSignature2018",
15 "creator": "did:example:ER_Public",
16 "created": "2010 -01 -01 T19 :23:25Z",
17 "nonce": "2bbgh3dgjg2302d -d2b3gi423d42",
18 "proofValue": "eyJ0eXAiOiJK ... gFWFOEjXk",
19 }
20 }
Listing 3: Example of a credential issued from ER to an EVU during UC-4. DIDs
are used as identifiers in the example. An example of Linked Data proof is given
in the proof section. The ER uses its public identity to make the signature of the
credential verifiable.
